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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Beef production is an important component of American industry and agriculture.  The 
estimated retail equivalent value of the U.S. beef industry was seventy-four billion dollars 
in 2007, which amounts to almost a quarter of farm sector cash receipts (ERS 2009).  In 
recent years, beef cattle producers have been exposed to increased uncertainty from 
multiple factors including high, volatile grain and energy prices and shocks caused from 
outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in North American herds.   High 
grain and energy prices, which are major inputs for feedlots, have narrowed profits since 
cattle prices have not increased as dramatically as other commodities.  Feedlots have 
been forced to run at bare-bone capacity or shut down when faced with high input prices 
and stagnant live cattle prices.  The biological timeline of cattle production, which is 
much lengthier than poultry or hogs, makes it difficult for producers to adjust supply 
rapidly to shocks such as high input prices (Stillman et al 2009).   
BSE, otherwise known as mad-cow disease, is a unique biological risk in cattle 
markets.  BSE can be spread to humans in the form of the fatal human variant Creutzeldt-
Jacob disease through consumption of spinal cord or brain tissue from infected animals.  
The first major BSE outbreaks occurred in England in the 1980’s and spread to Europe 
and Asia in later decades (CBC 2006).  Two prominent North American BSE cases 
occurred in 2003.  On May 20, 2003 a Canadian cow tested positive for BSE, and on 
December 23, 2003 a cow in Washington contracted BSE.  The fear from market 
participants in the wake of BSE outbreaks was multi-faceted.  There were legitimate 
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concerns about the safety of the American beef supply, the availability of export markets 
for American beef, and destruction of domestic demand for beef.  Many foreign countries 
in Asia and Europe responded immediately by shutting down imports of American beef, 
resulting in a drop of cattle exports from 9.6% in 2003 to 1.9% of production in 2004.  
Several studies (Paiva 2003, Tse and Hackard 2006, and Jin et al 2008) found evidence 
that BSE outbreaks had significant negative impacts on cattle futures prices.  Live cattle 
prices declined 19% in the immediate aftermath of the December 2003 BSE case, while 
feeder cattle prices declined 17%.  The ensuing price drop was stronger and longer-
lasting in nearby than deferred maturities.  Prices did recover fully after a few months, 
but volatility persisted at higher levels. 
Live and feeder cattle futures prices (Figures 1 and 2) have also experienced 
increased volatility in recent years, although price and volatility increases in grain and 
energy commodities have been much larger.  This combination of higher volatility in 
both input and output prices makes it increasingly difficult for producers to determine 
expected future price volatility and profit margins.  In this situation, it is critical for risk 
managers in cattle markets to have accurate information on expected price volatility in 
live and feeder cattle prices, and to manage their price risk in an effective manner.  
Accurately priced options contracts can provide these two functions simultaneously and 
are the focus of this research. 
The use of options on agricultural futures contracts has steadily increased in most 
commodities since trading resumed in October 1984.  Greater flexibility of strategies and 
smaller cash-flow impacts that options offer compared to futures contracts are likely part 
of the reason for this increase in popularity. A visit to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
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reveals that option pits for commodities are often busier than respective futures pits, due 
in part to the complexity of executing some option strategies.  Corn, soybeans, wheat, and 
hog option trading volumes have increased respectively 17, 93, 200, and 7 times from 
1984 to 2005 (Urcola 2007).  In contrast, live and feeder cattle trading volume have not 
seen such precipitous rises since option re-inception (Figure 3).  Live cattle option 
volume has increased about two-fold in magnitude, from 326,581 contracts in 1985 to 
722,634 in 2007, while feeder cattle volume has decreased from 134,814 contracts in 
1987 to 106,577 in 2007.  Figure 3 shows that live cattle annual volume is consistently 
several times larger than feeder cattle. 
 Despite their popularity among market participants, there are common perceptions 
that option premiums are too expensive.  Irwin (1990) found widespread beliefs among 
agricultural producers and traders that option sellers earned substantial risk premiums.  
Additionally, some advisory services have cautioned against using options because they 
are “too expensive” (Urcola 2007).  Call and put options can serve as insurance for 
producers, and some argue premiums are a manifestation of high cost of insurance.  
However, if overpricing is too severe, the loss associated with the premium can be greater 
than the insurance benefits gained.   If option premiums are too high, then option writers 
earn economic profits while buyers may be paying for insurance that is not likely to be 
needed.  Consistent profits to option sellers would also contradict the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH) which indicates that in an informed market, riskless arbitrage should 
drive prices to their true values and make systematic profits impossible.   
 Although most research on option pricing efficiency has been concentrated in 
financial markets, recent studies have examined agricultural markets.  Urcola (2007) 
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examined empirical returns from thirty- and ninety-day holding periods in corn, soybean, 
wheat, and hog options. Generally, results supported widespread efficient pricing in these 
markets as most of the option markets tested contained insignificant returns.  A few 
exceptions were found in hog puts, where profitable arbitrage opportunities existed.    
In a related vein, several studies have assessed the forecasting performance of 
implied volatility derived from cattle options.  In an efficiently priced options market, 
premiums reflect all information and their implied volatility provides the most effective 
forecast of subsequent realized volatility.  Using weekly data from 1984 to 1997, 
Manfredo, Leuthold, and Irwin (2001) found that implied volatility produced useful 
forecasts of spot price volatility in corn markets, but not for live and feeder cattle.  
Szakmary et al (2003), using daily data from 1989 to 2001, found that implied volatilities 
did not encompass GARCH alternatives in live and feeder cattle markets.  Using weekly 
data from 1986 to 1999, Manfredo and Sanders (2004) examined the forecasting 
performance of live cattle implied volatility in predicting one-week subsequent realized 
volatility.  Live cattle implied volatility was found to be an upwardly biased forecast, 
overstating realized volatility by 4.5%.  Even though live cattle implied volatility was a 
biased and inefficient forecast, it encompassed GARCH time-series alternatives.   
 
1.2 Objectives 
In this volatile and challenging environment, it is important for risk managers to have 
accurate information about expected price volatility in live and feeder cattle prices, and to 
know that the options used in their risk management activities are accurately priced.  The 
overall purpose of this thesis is to assess the economic efficiency of live and feeder cattle 
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option markets using empirical returns from holding options and the ability of implied 
volatility to predict realized volatility in underlying futures.  If options are accurately 
priced, expected economic profits should be zero, and implied volatility should serve as 
an unbiased, efficient predictor of realized volatility. 
 Empirical returns, calculated in dollar and percentage terms, are constructed using 
simulated buy and hold trading strategies executed thirty- and ninety-calendar days prior 
to option expiration.  Returns are subdivided into call and put options for both short-term 
(thirty-day) and long-term (ninety-day) holding periods.  Thirty-day returns reflect a 
holding period with considerable market liquidity, while ninety-day returns are consistent 
with holding periods used in many producer hedging strategies (Urcola 2007).  If 
significant empirical returns from call or put options are found, short straddle positions 
will be simulated to determine if those returns are driven by drifts in underlying futures 
prices, or whether options are mispriced due to volatility risk premiums or other relevant 
market phenomena.  
Weekly implied volatility, realized volatility, and alternative GARCH volatility 
series also are constructed to assess forecasting performance, using tests for bias, 
efficiency, and encompassing ability.  Weekly horizons are used because they may be 
more useful to risk managers than daily horizons (Manfredo and Sanders 2004), and the 
ability of implied volatility and GARCH forecasts deteriorate in longer-term horizons 
(Anderson, Bollerslev, and Lange, 1999; Poon 2003).  When implied volatility is biased 
overstating (understating) realized volatility, it implies that option premiums are over 
(under) priced for the risk prevalent in the market.  Efficiency and encompassing tests 
determine whether option markets incorporate information accurately and quickly, and 
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whether there exists an alternative forecast procedure that improves the ability of implied 
volatility to predict subsequent realized volatility.  When implied volatility is unbiased, 
efficient, and encompasses other forecasts, option premiums are accurately priced. 
 Particular attention in the analysis is given to differences in market behavior 
before and after abnormally volatile periods in cattle markets related to BSE outbreak 
during 2003 and 2004.  Jin et al (2008) identified October 2003 as a structural break in 
the live cattle market, which will serve as the dividing line between the “early” and 
“later” periods in our study.  Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the sharp increases in realized and 
implied volatility during this volatile period.  While October 2003 is used as the dividing 
line between periods, as identified earlier the volatility in cattle and related markets in the 
later period was influenced by numerous other agricultural and non-agricultural market 
disruptions.   
The research here augments previous work on live and feeder cattle option 
markets. Analysis of empirical returns to live and feeder cattle options and feeder cattle 
volatility forecasting have not been assessed previously.  Similarly, studies on live cattle 
volatility forecasting are not available for the recent periods of higher volatility which 
started in 2003. Additionally, this research provides analysis of cattle option performance 
using multiple time horizons and procedures.  Assessment of empirical returns is more 
applicable for analysis of long-term option performance, while volatility forecasts are 
suitable for short-term horizons.  The use of different horizons and procedures may 
permit a more complete assessment of the option markets ability to incorporate 
information into the pricing process, and signal the prices that market participants pay to 
manage their risk using these derivatives.   
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  The thesis is organized in a straightforward manner.  Chapter 2 reviews previous 
literature on efficient pricing, volatility forecasting, and possible problems with option 
pricing models.  Chapter 3 provides a more detailed explanation of the procedures used in 
the two broad tests of option performance.  Chapter 4 presents results from empirical 
returns and volatility forecasts and details any differences in the early and later periods.  
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings, identifies how they relate to the literature, and 
discusses their implications.  
 
1.3 Figures 
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Figure 1. Live Cattle Nearby Futures, 1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 2. Feeder Cattle Nearby Futures, 1/1987-1/2008
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Figure 3. Live and Feeder Cattle Option Volume, 1/1985-12/2007
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Figure 4. Live Cattle Daily Implied and Realized Volatility, 
3/2003-12/2004
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Figure 5. Feeder Cattle Daily Implied and Realized Volatility, 
3/2003-12/2004
Implied Volatility Realized Volatility
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BSE Case
American 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter examines market efficiency and options literature particularly relevant to the 
thesis research.  Section 2.1 explains how call and put options function and basic options 
pricing theory, while Sections 2.2 and 2.3 discuss the theory and previous research on the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and volatility forecasting.  Section 2.4 describes problems 
and/or weaknesses found with option pricing models.  Section 2.5 details impacts of mad-
cow disease outbreaks on cattle futures prices.  Section 2.6 summarizes suggestions 
found from previous research. 
 
2.1 Option Fundamentals and Pricing  
Options are financial instruments that give a buyer the right, but not obligation to 
purchase or sell an asset at a certain price (strike price) until a certain expiration date.   
Call options give the buyer the right to purchase an asset at the strike price, while put 
options allow the buyer to sell an asset.  Long option positions have limited financial 
consequences (the premium amount) with theoretically unlimited financial potential, 
while short option positions have limited upside (the premium amount) with theoretically 
unlimited downside.  Short option positions are also subject to margin calls if market 
prices move against their position.  
 Option premiums consist of two components: intrinsic value and time value.  The 
intrinsic value is the value that the option would have if it was exercised today.  Call 
options have intrinsic value if the futures price is greater than the strike price, while put 
options have intrinsic value if the futures price is less than the strike price.  This notion of 
11 
 
value is rational and consistent with economic theory; it is profitable to buy an asset for 
cheaper than the prevailing market price, and profitable to sell an asset for a higher price.  
Options that have intrinsic value are classified as “in-the-money,” while options with no 
intrinsic value are classified as “out-of-the-money.”  If the option strike price is closest to 
the futures price, the option is considered “at-the-money.” 
 The time value of an option is calculated by subtracting the intrinsic value from 
the option premium.  It reflects the market’s expectation about future volatility in the 
underlying asset making the option profitable.  Time value serves slightly different roles 
depending on whether the options are European or American in nature.  European options 
can only be exercised on the expiration date, while American options can be exercised at 
any time until option expiration. 
 Option premiums are influenced mainly by the underlying asset price, option 
strike price, time remaining until expiration, asset price volatility, and risk-free interest 
rates.  As prices of an asset increase, call options become more valuable and put options 
become less valuable.  The opposite is true if prices of an asset decrease.  The level of the 
option strike price is a key factor in determining if the option has intrinsic value.  For 
American options, the longer to expiration, the higher the value of the option because the 
probability that the option will be profitable increases.  This is not necessarily the case 
with European options due to the fixed nature of the time when they can be exercised.  
Increases in volatility of prices in the underlying asset will increase the value of both call 
and put options.  This is because options serve as insurance mechanisms against drastic 
price moves in either direction.  Option premiums decrease with higher risk-free interest 
rates because these higher rates reduce the present value of the cash flow from the option. 
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 Upper and lower bounds for premiums of European calls and put options are 
shown:   
( )( ,0)r T tMax F Ke c F    ( )( ,0)r T tMax Ke F p K      ,               (2.1)                 
 where c is the call option price, p is the put option price, F is the current futures price, K 
is the option strike price, r is the risk-free interest rate, and (T-t) is the time remaining 
until expiration.  The upper bound for call options is the futures price; because if the call 
premium was more expensive than the futures price, it would be cheaper to buy the 
contract instead of buying the call option.  Based on similar logic, the upper bound for 
put options is the strike price.  These upper and lower bounds are valid as long as interest 
rates are positive, and the price of the underlying asset is equal to or greater than zero.   
European call and put option prices are also intricately tied by the put-call parity, 
which identifies the relationship of the value of two portfolios at the same point in time.  
Consider a portfolio, A, formed by a call option plus a cash amount equal to rTKe , and 
another portfolio, B, formed by a put option plus an amount of cash equal to 0
rTF e .  
Since the cash in both portfolios is invested at the same risk-free interest rate, and the 
options can only be exercised at expiration, they must have the same value at time t.  This 
relationship is exhibited in Equation (2.2): 
                                             rT rToc Ke p F e
    .                                                    (2.2) 
The put-call parity has important implications for trading options because it shows that a 
call and put can be used interchangeably in a delta neutral portfolio, and that the implied 
volatility of calls and puts with the same strike and expiration date should be identical.   
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2.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis Framework and Previous Research 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that prices of financial assets are efficient 
when they incorporate all known information.  In this situation, an investor who “beats” 
the market only does so through chance.  Prices are said to behave following a “random-
walk” movement, because past prices and information are irrelevant to future price 
movement.  In this context, predicting future price movement is comparable to flipping a 
coin.  EMH was first discussed in the 1900 dissertation “The Theory of Speculation” by 
Bachelier.  His theories were ignored for several decades, even though some research in 
the 1930’s and 1940’s showed that stock prices did behave in a random walk movement.  
Further work supporting the EMH hypothesis has been done by Fama (1970, 1998), Paul 
Samuelson (1965), and other economists.   
 The mathematical test for EMH can be expressed as,  
                                               ,( ) 0j T TE r   .                    (2.3) 
Equation 2.3 states that the economic profits for an instrument j, given a set of 
information T , should be zero (Malkiel 2003).  It asserts that current market prices 
already reflect known information and consist of an unbiased expectation of future prices.  
New information is reflected in prices almost instantly so economic profit opportunities 
beyond the market average do not exist. Certain financial arrangements such as no 
transaction costs, equal tax rates, and feasible transactions at the risk-free interest rate are 
required for Equation 2.3 to remain valid so that market participants can take advantage 
of any profitable arbitrage opportunities that may exist. 
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There are several categories of market efficiency possible within the EMH 
framework.  These include weak, semi-strong, and strong forms of efficiency.  Weak and 
semi- strong efficiency argue that all public information (ФT) is already factored into 
today’s prices.  Weak form efficiency states that technical analysis based on the price 
series can’t be used to produce excess returns, while semi-strong form efficiency argues 
that both technical and fundamental analysis based on all public information will not 
produce excess returns.  Under strong form efficiency, prices reflect all public and private 
information, thus no market participants can earn excess returns. 
 Buccola (1989) examined long-run efficiency using the unit transaction costs for 
an agricultural firm of carrying a good from time t to t +1.   If prices are perfectly 
efficient, profits should be zero as all information about Pt+1 should be compounded from 
Pt .  In this case, the profits from the conditional distribution should equal the 
unconditional distribution.  Equation 2.4 states that, 
                     1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0t t t t t st tE E P P C E          ,                 (2.4) 
where 1t   is the conditional distribution, 1tP  is the unconditional distribution, t  is the 
forecast information, and stC is the competitive unit cost for the firm.  Further 
development of 2.4 states that the conditional and unconditional profit variances are 
equal to each other, 
                                 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t t tVar Var P Var       .                                       (2.5) 
Fama’s work looked at two different scenarios, where forecast information, t  
was either considered an  assets’s own profit history, all public information, or all public 
and private information.  Weak-form efficiency is present if Equations 2.4 and 2.5 hold 
15 
 
true if t  is a good’s own profit history, while semi-strong efficiency is present if 
Equations 2.4 and 2.5 are accurate for all public information.  Strong form efficiency is 
present if the same conditions apply for all public and private information. 
 Most economists accept that markets are weak or semi-strong form efficient, but 
there is ongoing controversy about whether markets are strong form efficient.  
Phenomena like the October 1987 market crash, tech bust in 2000, and long-run success 
of professional investors like Warren Buffet question the notion that prices are always 
rational, reflect all known information, and that no one can earn excess returns in the long 
term.  Recent work in the field of behavioral finance suggests that emotional biases in 
market participants can create anomalies that result in deviations from efficient market 
behavior.  Studies of dynamic decision making by futures and options traders support the 
existence of behavioral biases such as house-money and loss aversion effects (Mattos, 
Garcia, and Penning 2008).  If such behavioral tendencies were widespread, violations of 
market efficiency could occur.   
 Most of the papers published testing the veracity of EMH have focused on 
financial indices like the S&P 500.   However, in recent years several studies have 
examined agricultural option markets.   One study by Urcola (2007) examined empirical 
returns from simulated trading strategies of thirty- and ninety-day holding periods in 
corn, soybean, wheat, and hog options markets.   Overall, efficient pricing of corn, 
soybean, wheat, and hog options markets was supported as only eleven out of eighty 
contracts contained significant returns.  However, there were several exceptions, as 
evidence of profitable arbitrage opportunities was found in hog puts.   
16 
 
 In Urcola’s study, most pooled percent returns for call and put options in the 
commodities contained zero in their respective confidence intervals, which supported 
efficient pricing. One exception was in wheat call options, where negative returns of -
29.9% were statistically significant.  Some patterns in returns from commodities and 
holding periods were found.  Thirty-day corn calls and puts tended to have slightly 
negative percent returns, while ninety-day options had insignificant positive returns.   
Thirty-day soybean calls and puts also had marginally negative percent returns, while 
ninety-day percent returns were close to zero.  Wheat calls appeared to be slightly 
overpriced and puts marginally under-priced.  Both call and put options were modestly 
underpriced in the hog market, as buyers averaged mildly positive returns. When returns 
for commodities were examined in dollars per contract, hog and corn options had 
relatively small dollar returns while wheat options had the largest dollar returns. 
Several studies have examined returns from straddle positions in agricultural 
options (Simon 2002; McKenzie and Holt 2007), consisting of a combined option 
position of one call and one put.  A call and put are bought in a long straddle, while a call 
and put are sold in a short straddle.  Simon found that while implied volatility and 
GARCH forecast volatility overstated realized volatility substantially in corn options, 
short straddle positions designed to capture this volatility overstatement were not 
profitable.  McKenzie and Holt examined long straddles in hog markets around the 
release of Hogs and Pigs Reports, and found long straddle positions were profitable if 
positions were exited on the day of the report release.  Both distortions in the underlying 
futures price and implied volatility could have contributed to this result, although profits 
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from long straddles would not have been systematic after transaction costs were 
considered.   
Investigation of straddle positions is informative to an assessment of option 
market efficiency.  Independent evaluation of the value of put (call) options implicitly 
assumes that the futures market for the commodity is efficient and unaffected by drifts in 
prices.  In the long term, this is often a tenable assumption, but drifts in futures prices can 
occur which would distort an assessment of efficiency in a related options market.  For 
instance, during a period the value of holding a put (call) option would increase if the 
futures price unexpectedly declines (increases) below (above) the strike price. However, 
returns from straddle positions cancel out the effect of unexpected drifts in futures prices 
because they involve simultaneous call and put positions, and reflect the ability of the 
options market through its premiums to assess expected volatility.  In this context, when 
options markets are effectively priced, their implied volatility mirrors the realized 
volatility. If significant returns are generated using short (long) straddle positions, 
evidence exists that options premiums are over- (under-) priced relative to the risk in the 
market. 
 
2.3 Volatility Forecasting Framework and Previous Research  
Calculating empirical option returns is considered a direct test of option pricing 
efficiency.  An alternative procedure to examine option performance is testing the 
forecasting ability of implied volatility (IV).  The IV of an option is the volatility that will 
yield a theoretical option price equal to the current market price.  If options are accurate 
volatility forecasters, IV should provide an unbiased and efficient forecast of realized 
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volatility (RV) in the underlying asset.  IV’s are widely used by option writers in pricing 
options, thus if IV serves as an unbiased and efficient estimator of future volatility on the 
underlying asset, premiums would be priced at a level where economic returns would 
average zero.  If IV was a biased or inefficient estimator, significant returns could 
possibly be captured if the nature of the bias or inefficiency was known. 
The most popular model for calculating the IV of European options is the Black-
Scholes Model, which was developed by Black, Scholes, and Merton.  Merton expanded 
Black and Scholes’ work to include formulas for different types of options.  The model 
represented a major advancement in option pricing because it developed a stochastic 
equation to determine the theoretical “correct” price of an option that was based on an 
underlying asset.  The Black-Scholes Model assumes that the underlying asset follows a 
geometric Brownian motion, 
                      dS Sdt Sdz    ,                                                            (2.6) 
where S is the underlying asset price, µ is the expected growth rate,  is the asset’s 
volatility, and z is a Wiener process.  The Wiener process states that the volatility of the 
asset’s returns is known and constant.  Assuming that a call, c, or put, p, is a function of S 
and t, then (2.6) leads to formulas for pricing calls and puts, equations (2.7) and (2.8). 
      ( )1 2( , ) ( ) ( )
r T tc S t SN d Ke N d                      (2.7) 
     ( ) 2 1( , ) ( ) ( )
r T tp S t Ke N d SN d     ,                             (2.8)        
where 
2
1
ln( / ) ( / 2)( )S K T td
T t


   , 2 1d d T t   , N is the normal cumulative 
distribution function, and r is the risk-free interest rate.  From these formulas, the IV of 
an option can be calculated if the option premium, underlying asset price, strike price, 
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interest rate, and time to maturity are known.  Option traders and other market 
participants often will consider the implied volatilities rather than premiums when 
choosing between two different options.  Options that are in-the-money (ITM) will have 
larger premiums than out-of-the-money (OTM) options, but analysis of IV from each 
option will give a better comparison of which option is “cheaper”.  For example, if live 
cattle futures were trading at $67.42/cwt on January 2, a put expiring on January 25 with 
a $67/cwt strike and a premium of $1.1/cwt would have an implied volatility of .258 
while a put with a $71 strike and a $4 premium would have an IV of .238.   
 The Black-Scholes model is valid in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, 
transaction costs, taxes, or dividends.  Additionally, it must be possible to borrow or lend 
at the risk-free interest rate.  The Black-Scholes model is designed for European options, 
but past studies have shown the error is minimal when at-the-money American options 
are used. 
 Another factor that tests the real-world usefulness of the Black-Scholes model is 
the length of forecast horizon.  The effectiveness of IV forecasts may deteriorate as the 
time remaining until expiration lengthens.  Implied volatilities from long maturity options 
have been found to overreact to changes in IV from short maturity options (Stein 1989).  
These long maturity options tend to overemphasize the short maturity options’ IV instead 
of relying on historical tendencies that such sharp spikes in volatility will not last.  Stein’s 
results tend to reject the assertion that volatility expectations are formed rationally.  
Several studies have examined the forecasting ability of IV from agricultural 
options.  Hauser and Liu (1990) simulated alternative valuation techniques for live cattle 
options using data from 1984-1987.  Some of the valuation techniques used were twenty-
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one day realized variance and constant variance.  They found that no consistent arbitrage 
opportunities were present using the forecast methods.  Using the Black-Scholes model, 
the results generally tended to suggest that cattle markets were efficient when after-cost 
returns were considered. 
Manfredo, Leuthold, and Irwin (2001) examined spot price volatility in the corn 
and cattle markets using multiple forecasts, including time-series, IV, and composite 
techniques.  They found that IV techniques provided useful forecasts for corn cash price 
volatility but not for live and feeder cattle.  However, there are some concerns about 
extrapolating cash price rather than futures price volatility from option IV.  There may be 
some mitigating factors that reduce the forecasting effectiveness when implied volatility 
is translated to spot prices rather than futures prices. 
Szakmary et al (2003) studied the predictive power of IV in 35 futures markets, 
including thirteen agricultural markets.  They created a daily IV series for each contract, 
which was then used to assess forecasting ability in the corresponding daily realized 
volatility series.  Time-series alternatives in their study included historical volatility and 
GARCH(1,1) forecasts.  For most markets studied, IV encompassed both alternatives.  
However, results in live and feeder cattle suggested that both historical volatility and 
GARCH forecasts contained additional information. 
Manfredo and Sanders (2004) studied the performance of live cattle IV in 
forecasting the one-week realized volatility (RV) of live cattle futures prices.  Forecast 
encompassing was tested by the addition of a GARCH (1,1) model, which functioned as a 
time-series alternative to IV.  Implied volatility overstated subsequent one-week RV by 
4.5%, which implied that IV was a biased predictor of RV.  Implied volatility forecast 
21 
 
errors increased with higher IV levels, indicating that IV was not a minimum variance 
forecast and thus an inefficient forecast.  Implied volatility encompassed GARCH 
alternatives because IV forecast errors were not improved with the addition of GARCH 
(1,1) forecasts.  Their results also found that there has been significant statistical 
improvement in the forecasting ability of IV and GARCH over time, but it is unknown 
whether this is due to a systematic decline in live cattle futures price volatility or if the 
model, market information, electronic trading, etc. is making forecasts better as time 
progresses.  They concluded that live cattle IV was a biased and inefficient forecast that 
still encompassed GARCH alternatives. 
Egelkraut and Garcia (2006) constructed implied forward volatilities of one-, two-
, and three-month intervals for corn, soybean, soybean meal, wheat, and hog markets.  
Implied forward volatilities were calculated from the term structure of IV, which was 
constructed from IV’s with different time horizons.  They found that implied forward 
volatilities provided unbiased and reasonably efficient forecasts of RV in the corn and 
soybean markets.  However, implied forward volatilities in the soybean meal, wheat, and 
hog markets were found to be biased.  Alternative historical forecasts seemed to provide 
additional information for these commodities.  Implied volatility held greater predictive 
power for commodities with narrow and well-defined critical growing periods and 
geographic regions.  Soybeans and corn markets have these characteristics of critical 
growing periods and well-defined geographic regions, while soybean meal, wheat, and 
hog markets are more indeterminate in nature.  Risks premiums in soybean meal, wheat, 
and hog markets may be present in compensation for bearing unforeseen volatility risks 
in those markets. 
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2.4 Weaknesses in Option Pricing Models  
Models designed to predict stock or futures prices may be problematic when extended to 
option prices.  One phenomenon in option markets that could lead to incorrect pricing is 
the “path peso problem.”  This is a situation where rare, catastrophic events are 
anticipated when the asset is priced, but do not occur often enough in the sample to 
justify the observed price (Branger and Schlag 2005).  This creates a situation where the 
empirical distribution is different from the true distribution.  For instance, if events that 
would cause a market crash are observed less frequently than the probability implied by 
the market, then put option prices would appear too expensive.   
 There have been attempts to correct flaws in modeling put option premiums by 
constructing specific option pricing models based on possible phenomena like risk 
premiums, path peso problems, biased beliefs, etc.  Bondarenko (2003) found that even if 
explanations like the path peso problem and biased beliefs are used, it still does not 
explain the amount of mispricing in S&P 500 Index puts.  From 1987 to 2000, buyers of 
S&P puts with one month to expiration lost on average 39% per month for at-the-money 
puts and 95% per month for out-of-the money puts.  This mispricing resulted in an 
eighteen billion dollar transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers of these options.  
Another possible occurrence of path peso problems was shown in a study of call, 
put, and straddle positions in the S&P 500 by Coval and Shumway (2000).  They argued 
that call options should receive greater returns than those realized by holding the 
underlying asset, while put options should receive lower returns due to the systematic 
risks being hedged by put options.  Their results showed that call options averaged a 
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weekly return of two percent while put options returns were about negative eight percent 
per week.  Straddle positions resulted in a weekly return of negative three percent.  One 
possibility proposed for this negative return was a path peso problem, since the market 
could have viewed the likelihood of additional 1987 style market crashes as more 
probable than was found in the historical distribution. 
 
2.5 BSE Outbreak Effects on Futures Prices  
Since the 1980’s, there have been major health and safety concerns about the effects of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and the possibility of transmission to other 
cows and to humans through Creutzeldt-Jakob disease (CJD).  BSE is transmitted from 
diseased to healthy cattle when meat and bone meal from BSE infected cows is included 
in protein supplements for healthy cattle.  Older cows (4-5 years+) are much more 
susceptible to contracting BSE than younger animals.  Humans can contract CJD through 
the consumption of meat from the brain or nervous system of a BSE infected cow.  There 
were widespread BSE outbreaks in England during 1986 and 1987 that produced dozens 
of positive BSE cases.  By 1993, there were almost 1,000 new BSE cases per week in 
England.  In response, English beef was banned in the EU and many other export 
markets.  Eventually BSE outbreaks spread to Europe and Asia as well.  The USDA 
responded in 1997 by banning the use of bone and tissue meal as a protein supplement 
(CBC 2006).  Two significant mad-cow outbreaks were announced in Canada on May 20, 
2003 and in Washington on December 23, 2003.  There were over a dozen subsequent 
BSE cases in North America after December 23, 2003. 
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 Paiva (2003) tested whether the major English BSE outbreaks had significant 
effects on U.S. live cattle future prices.  Time horizons were divided into normal periods 
before the outbreaks, and event periods which spanned just before the outbreak to several 
days afterwards.  There was strong evidence of significant negative impacts of the BSE 
incidents on the April and October contracts tested.  There was no indication that 
information about the outbreaks was leaked before announcements were made. 
 Tse and Hackard (2006) tested livestock and grain future reactions in the minutes 
and days following the two mad-cow outbreaks in Canada and the United States in 2003.  
Data was used to test for evidence of herding behavior in traders after the 
announcements.  Herding behavior surfaces when there are three facets of uncertainty: 1) 
the existence of a shock 2) the effects of a shock and 3) quality of traders’ information. 
Evidence after the Canadian BSE incident on May 20, 2003 shows evidence of herding 
behavior in livestock, grain, and equity markets.  Herd behavior can often lead to 
significant mispricing in the afflicted markets.  Prices rebounded in just a few days to 
pre-May 20 announcement levels as the effect of banning Canadian imports was bullish 
for U.S. live cattle prices.   Evidence of herding behavior was harder to identify in the 
wake of the United State’s December 23 announcement, since the holiday period 
prevented trading from taking place in much of the immediate aftermath.  Nonetheless, 
there was an eighteen percent decline in live cattle futures from December 23, 2003 to 
January 5, 2004, and a corresponding thirteen percent drop in feeder cattle futures.  Prices 
did rebound some when it was learned that the Washington cow was born in Canada, but 
the closing of export markets by Japan, South Korea, and others kept future prices lower 
than pre-announcement levels for quite some time. 
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 Jin, Power, and Elbakidze (2008) tested the effects of sixteen North American 
BSE cases on the timing of structural breaks in cattle markets and the amount of impact 
by contract maturity month.  They identified a structural break in live cattle futures that 
occurred in October 2003.  This break occurred five months after the Canadian BSE 
incident and two months before the American case.  Possible explanations cited for the 
structural break included speculation that the ban would be lifted on imported Canadian 
cattle that were older than thirty months.   The impact of the American BSE case in 
December 2003 was more severe than the May 2003 Canadian case.  The impact was 
biggest in nearby maturity contracts, where volatility did not drop to pre-announcement 
levels for eleven weeks.  The other fourteen BSE cases that occurred after 2003 did not 
have significant impacts on cattle prices.  This could have been a result of most of the 
damage already being done, since many export markets were already shut down from the 
first American case in December 2003. 
 
2.6 Suggestions from Previous Research 
Previous work done in EMH and volatility forecasting frameworks provide some insight 
into what might be found if feeder and live cattle option performance are studied.  
Urcola’s results generally supported efficient pricing in agricultural option markets, with 
a few exceptions in hog puts.  Implied volatility studies by Egelkraut and Garcia seemed 
to support forecasting efficiency for corn and soybean options, but cast doubt on the 
unbiased nature of IV in soybean meal, wheat, and hog options.  Hauser and Liu’s 
findings suggested that cattle options were efficient if after cost returns were considered, 
but more recently Manfredo and Sanders found that IV provided a biased and inefficient 
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forecast of realized volatility for live cattle options.  Szakmary found that IV did not 
encompass GARCH alternatives using daily data, while Manfredo and Sanders found that 
on weekly horizons, IV did encompass GARCH alternatives.  Studies of BSE outbreaks 
suggest significant associated impacts on cattle futures prices, but little research has been 
done of BSE outbreak events on option performance.  
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CHAPTER 3  
DATA AND PROCEDURES 
This chapter describes the data and methods used in research on option performance.  
Section 3.1 discusses the dataset, Section 3.2 explains the steps used to construct 
empirical option returns and the procedures used to assess the efficiency of the option 
markets, and Section 3.3 details steps used to construct implied volatility and GARCH 
forecasts of subsequent realized volatility. 
 
3.1 Dataset Characteristics  
The database consisted of daily settlement prices, volume, and open interest for live and 
feeder cattle options, provided by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  Settlement 
prices are used instead of closing prices because they are less likely to have rounding 
errors or violate non-arbitrage restrictions. Settlement prices are determined by pit 
committee members and by a computer software program.  Additional data added include 
daily live and feeder cattle futures prices from the CRB and interest rates, based on the 
three month T-bill rate reported by the St. Louis Branch of the Federal Reserve.   
Live cattle option data are composed of 543,430 individual observations, ranging 
from 10/30/1984 to 1/30/2008.  There were 4,646 unique options of varying strikes and 
expirations traded during the period, which results in an average of 117 observations per 
option.  The average annual volume for live cattle option contracts traded was 654,824.  
Live cattle options expire in six different months: February, April, June, August, October, 
and December. Prior to 1991, live cattle options expired on the last business Friday of the 
28 
 
month preceding the contract month.  After 1991, live cattle options expired on the first 
business Friday of the contract month.   
Feeder cattle option data are comprised of 493,103 observations, ranging from 
1/9/1987 to 1/30/2008.  There were 5,094 unique options traded during the period, with 
an average of ninety-seven observations per option.  Average annual volume in feeder 
cattle option was 139,974 option contracts, about one-fifth the volume seen in live cattle 
markets.   Feeder cattle options expire in eight different months: January, March, April, 
May, August, September, October, and November.  Feeder cattle options expire on the 
last business Thursday of the contract month. 
Option premiums are quoted on a $/cwt basis in the dataset.  Live cattle futures 
contracts are for 40,000 pounds while feeder cattle futures contracts are for 50,000 
pounds.  In order to calculate dollar returns per contract, returns are multiplied by 400 for 
live cattle and 500 for feeder cattle. 
 
3.2 Empirical Returns Procedures  
This section describes the procedures and trading strategies used to compute empirical 
option returns using the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a benchmark for evaluating 
option pricing efficiency.  The general trading strategies consist of buying call or put 
options a predetermined number of days prior to expiration, and holding those positions 
until the option expires.   The holding periods examined are for thirty- and ninety-
calendar days prior to expiration, consistent with previous research in other markets 
(Urcola 2007).  Shorter horizons increase the number of observations captured, while 
long-term horizons may more closely replicate hedging strategies used by producers in 
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these markets.  The use of multiple horizons may provide a more complete assessment of 
option performance.    
       The structure of the trading strategies minimizes the effects of bid-ask spreads and 
transaction costs because there is only one trade executed concurrent with each option 
position. Since there are no systematic estimates of bid-ask spreads in commodity option 
markets, empirical option returns are computed assuming no transaction costs.  If 
significant economic profits are identified, then the level of transaction costs needed to 
mitigate profits is discussed.   
In order to assess the EMH with option premiums, initial option premiums1 are 
converted into forward option premiums, to account for the time value of money.  Initial 
options premiums are converted using: 
                                                  ,       (3.1)  
where Pf  is the forward option premium, Pi is the initial option premium, rf is the risk free 
rate of interest, and (T-t) is the number of days the option is held.   
 Option returns are calculated in the following manner:                  
  R=Pexp-Pf   ,                                                     (3.2)  
where R is the option return, Pexp is the option premium at expiration, and Pf  is the 
forward option premium. Percentage returns are calculated as  
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1 Initial option premiums are defined as the option premium when the position is taken, either thirty- or 
ninety- calendar days prior to option expiration. 
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where pK,t and cK,t are the premium of the put and call with strike price K at time t and FT 
is the price of the underlying futures at expiration. Since initial option premiums are 
converted into forward premiums, returns are in excess of the risk-free interest rate.  
 Sharpe Ratios are used to determine how well the return on an investment 
compensates the investor for the risk taken in holding that investment.  This ratio is 
useful in composing a “common denominator” to compare assets with different returns 
and volatility levels. The Sharpe’s ratio is calculated as:           
       ,                                         (3.4) 
 where R is the option return.   Because initial option premiums are converted into 
forward premiums that incorporate the time value of money, there is no need to subtract 
the risk-free rate of return from the option return to calculate the Sharpe ratio.   
 Several filters such as minimum volume traded, option strike moneyness, and 
minimum option premium are applied to the data on the date when the option position is 
taken.  The first filter is based on minimum volume requirements.  Observations are only 
kept in the final dataset if at least one contract is traded.  The volume requirement is used 
because prices of options that are not traded do not contain the same amount of price 
discovery information and reliability that actual transactions between buyers and sellers 
convey. Urcola used a minimum volume requirement of five contracts for corn and 
soybeans, and one contract for wheat and hogs.  Following Urcola, a one-contract 
minimum requirement for less heavily traded options markets is used.  
 The next filter applied is strike price moneyness.  Futures prices are used to 
construct upper and lower bounds within which the strike price falls.  Following Urcola, a 
range of 92.5 to 107.5 percent of the futures price is used.  Options that have strikes 
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outside of this moneyness range are highly erratic, lightly traded, and exhibit the well-
known volatility smile problem, in which deeply in-the-money or out-of-the-money 
options have much higher IV’s than those at-the-money.  This filter is applied to the 
options when the position is taken, not at expiration.  For example, on 12/22/1985, the 
futures price for the December 1985 contract is 65.62.  The upper bound is 70.54 
(65.62*1.075), while the lower bound is 60.70 (65.62*.925).  Options on that date with 
the same contract that have strikes falling between 60.70 and 70.54 are included in the 
dataset provided they pass the other filters.  
Another filter used is minimum initial option premium.  Initial option premiums 
when a position is initiated must be at least three times the minimum tick size.  Options 
with premiums smaller than this standard tend to be very illiquid, and most of their 
associated volume consists of block trade positions being liquidated.  Additionally, the 
extreme percentage returns possible with these options can bias results.  The minimum 
tick size for live and feeder cattle is $.025/cwt, so initial option premiums must be equal 
to or greater than $.075/cwt.   
In many cases thirty- or ninety-days prior to expiration falls on a weekend2, so no 
observation is available for that specific option if strict time periods are used.  To 
maximize the number of observations captured, option observations twenty-nine, thirty, 
and thirty-one days prior are selected for the thirty-day holding period.  Similarly, eighty-
nine, ninety, and ninety-one day prior dates from expiration are used for the ninety day 
holding periods.   
                                                 
2 Live cattle options expire on Friday and feeder cattle options expire on Thursday, thus thirty-days prior to 
expiration dates frequently fall on a Saturday or Sunday. 
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          Since multiple observations can occur for a particular option if trading occurred 
twenty-nine-, thirty-, and/or thirty-one days prior to expiration, pivot tables are used in 
Excel to select only one prior date for each observation.  Thirty-days prior is the preferred 
selection, but if an observation for this date is not present, then the twenty-nine day prior 
date is used.  If both the thirty and twenty-nine day prior date are not available, then the 
thirty-one day prior date is used.  The same decision process is used for the ninety-day 
holding period.   
Observations that passed filters are grouped into moneyness categories.  Several 
option characteristics, including the sensitivity of an option to price movement in the 
underlying futures (option’s delta and gamma), changes in the option’s volatility 
(option’s vega), and option trading volume are influenced by the relative moneyness of 
the option strike price.  To ascertain whether live and feeder cattle option statistics vary 
across moneyness, options were divided into moneyness “bins.” Options whose strike 
price is between 92.5 and 95.5 percent of the futures price are grouped into the .94 
moneyness bin.  The same process is applied to generate .97, 1.00, 1.03, and 1.06 
moneyness bins.  For calls, options falling in the 1.03 and 1.06 moneyness bins are out-
of-the-money while those in the .94 and .97 bins are in-the-money.  For puts, the opposite 
is true.  Options falling in the 1.00 moneyness bin are considered at-the-money for both 
calls and puts.  Options that are out-of-the money usually have heavier volume than those 
in-the-money because the premiums from out-of-the-money options are smaller.   
 After the filters are applied and pivot tables used to eliminate duplicates, there are 
1,946 thirty-day live cattle, 1,417 ninety-day live cattle, 1,698 thirty-day feeder cattle, 
and 1,304 ninety-day feeder cattle options remaining.   Options are traded more heavily 
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in periods closer to expiration, so it is logical that there are more thirty-day observations 
than ninety-day observations.  Thirty- and ninety-day live cattle subsets have roughly 
equivalent amounts of calls and puts, while puts are about ten percent more prevalent 
than calls in the thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle observations.  For instance, there 
were 969 thirty-day live cattle call options and 977 thirty-day live cattle put options.  
There were 810 thirty-day feeder cattle call options and 888 thirty-day feeder cattle put 
options.   
 Based on annual volume shown in Figure 1, one would expect live cattle options 
to outnumber feeder cattle options, but the numbers are roughly equal.  Notice there were 
4,646 individual live cattle options that expired from 1985 to 2007, and 5,094 feeder 
cattle options that expired from 1987 to 2007.  Also, live cattle options expire in six 
different months in a year, while feeder cattle options expire in eight months in a year.  
Additionally, notice that it didn’t matter if 500 contracts or one contract were traded in 
the filtering process.  Both of these situations lead to only one observation for that option.  
As a result, there are only fifteen percent more live cattle observations for thirty-day 
holding periods, and nine percent more for ninety-day holding periods. 
To establish clearly the data generating procedures, consider a live cattle put 
option for the February 1986 contract with a $60 strike that expired on 1/24/1986 with a 
final settlement price of $.275/cwt.  When the position was set thirty-days prior to 
expiration, the option met all the filters. Four hundred and sixteen contracts were traded 
on that day, larger than the minimum requirement of one contract.  The futures price for 
the February 1986 live cattle contract was $62.90, which produced an upper moneyness 
bound of $67.62 and the lower bound of $58.18.  The option’s strike of $60/cwt fell 
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within this range, and was grouped into the .94 moneyness bin. The initial option 
premium on 12/26/1985 was $.45/cwt, greater than the minimum requirement of .075. 
The forward option premium on 12/26/1985 was $.453/cwt, which resulted in a return of 
-$.178/cwt when the option expired on 1/24/1986.  This price movement resulted in 
dollar and percent returns of -$71.20 and -39.23% for this option.  
The construction of appropriate confidence intervals is crucial in determining the 
statistical significance of returns found.  For normally distributed variables, one can use a 
t-value to determine the 95% confidence interval.  However, option returns tend to be 
non-normally distributed and skewed, depending largely on the moneyness range.  
Consequently, a Jarque-Bera test of normality is run to test if the returns are normally 
distributed.  The Jarque-Bera equation,  
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        (3.5) 
where n is the number of observations, S is sample skewness, and K is sample kurtosis, 
tests the joint null hypothesis that the sample skewness and kurtosis are zero.  The 
Jarque-Bera test uses a critical value based on a Chi-squared distribution to assess 
normality.  Tables 2-9 show that all subsets of the data failed the normality test since 
Jarque-Bera statistics were greater than critical values.  Consequently, bootstrapping 
procedures are run with 2000 trials for option subsets to calculate 95% confidence 
intervals.  Bootstrapping is a process where estimators (like mean or variance) are 
calculated from an empirical distribution through a process of repeated sampling with 
replacement from the original dataset.  Bootstrapping procedures are run using STATA. 
 Live and feeder cattle price levels have been increasing over time (Figures 1 and 
2), and price increases in recent years have been sharper in feeder cattle.  These price 
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trends would suggest that holders of put options would average negative returns while 
call holders would experience positive returns.  If these patterns in significant returns are 
found, the construction of short straddle positions could help isolate possible causes of 
significant returns in these option subsets.  Short straddles are constructed by selling a 
call and put option of the same strike and maturity.  Short straddle buyers are betting that 
future volatility will be lower than market expectations.    Short straddle returns are 
calculated from the combined returns of a short call and short put position,   
R=Pf-Pexp   .          (3.6) 
Consequently, short straddle positions are profitable if premiums at expiration are less 
than forward premiums calculated when the position is set.   
 If returns from call or put options are caused solely from futures price drifts, 
losses on one end of the straddle will offset profits on the other.  Thus, if positive profits 
are found in call options but the construction of short straddle positions of the same 
holding period yields insignificant profits, then these options are not necessarily 
mispriced, since futures price movements led to those returns.  However, if significant 
returns are found from short straddle positions, it would suggest that the level of option 
mispricing could not be solely explained from futures price movements.  One possible 
cause for mispricing of this magnitude could be the presence of a volatility risk premium 
present in option premiums.  If this was the case, option buyers would be willing to pay 
“extra” in order to hedge their price risk, and/or option sellers would demand extra 
compensation for enduring subsequent price volatility.  Another possible cause could be 
path peso problems, where market participants would be overestimating the probability of 
future catastrophic events, such as significant BSE outbreaks in North America.  If this 
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was the case, options would appear overpriced because the probability of future 
disastrous outcomes was overestimated compared to the historical distribution.   
 Short straddle returns are simulated as buy and hold trading strategies both thirty- 
and ninety-days prior to expiration.  If straddle positions were exited prior to expiration, 
persistent presence of risk premiums or path peso problems would nullify possible returns 
since option premiums when the position was exited would also be biased from the same 
causes.  However, when straddles are held until expiration, premiums at expiration would 
not contain risk premiums or path peso problems, since only the intrinsic value of the 
options would remain.  This allows for possible profits to be found from these positions if 
market expectations of volatility are too high. 
 
3.3 Volatility Forecasting Procedures  
Option performance can also be assessed by the forecasting performance of implied 
volatility in predicting subsequent realized volatility on underlying futures prices.  While 
volatility analysis is not as direct an evaluation of option pricing as an assessment of 
empirical returns, it can provide useful information to market participants and other 
decision makers on the ability of the market to forecast volatility.  Analysis can also 
provide insight into whether market-based implied volatility forecasts of realized 
volatility can be improved by the addition of alternative forecasts.  Two volatility 
forecasts, implied volatility (IV) and GARCH-type (General Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity), are used to predict subsequent one-week realized volatility.  All 
volatility measures are converted to an annualized basis.   
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For each commodity, forecasts are generated over the same period after allowing 
for four years of data to develop the GARCH models.  As a result, the live cattle series 
runs from 1989 to 2008, and the feeder cattle from 1991 to 2008.  There were 996 weekly 
observations for live cattle volatility measures and 887 for feeder cattle.  Volatility 
measures are calculated based on weekly Wednesday futures prices and option premiums.  
If Wednesday is a trading holiday, then data from Tuesday is used as a substitute.   
The first step of construction involves matching the nearby contract with the 
weekly dates and rolling over to the next contract when appropriate.  The nearby contract 
is used until eight days prior to expiration, at which point the rollover to the next contract 
occurs.  Other studies have rolled over earlier in the contract.  For example, Manfredo 
and Sanders (2004) rolled over fifteen days prior to expiration, while others have rolled 
over at the end of the month before expiration.  However, we examined both methods of 
contract rollover and found negligible differences in average volatilities.  Contracts are 
rolled over closer to expiration in order to make comparisons between volatility forecasts 
and empirical returns more comparable, since options are held until expiration using 
empirical return procedures.   
3.3.1 Implied Volatility 
Implied volatilities represent the volatility the market expects the underlying asset to 
experience until option expiration.  Implied volatilities are viewed as forecasts for future 
realized volatility in financial and agricultural markets.  The IV’s from the four options, 
two calls and two puts, which are closest to being at-the-money are averaged to calculate 
the weekly IV observation in the series.  For example, on 8/28/1985, live cattle nearby 
futures were trading at 55.70.  The four options selected are the calls and puts at the $56 
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and $54 strikes.  The call and put at the $56 strike have IV’s of 20.57% and 20.54%, 
while the call and put at the $54 strike have IV’s of 22.72% and 22.88%.  The IV value 
for that week’s observation is 21.68%, the average of the four individual option IV’s.  At-
the-money options are used because they generally contain the most information about 
future volatility and avoid the problems of the “volatility smile” found in options that are 
deeply out or in-the-money.  A “goal-seek” macro is used in Excel to calculate the 
implied volatility for each option, based on the option strike, option premium, time to 
maturity, futures price, and interest rate.  The St. Louis Federal Reserve three month t-bill 
rate was selected as the risk-free interest rate.    
3.3.2 Realized Volatility 
A feasible measure of realized volatility (RV) is needed to measure the performance of 
volatility forecasts.  Since true RV is not directly observable, equation (3.7) is a common 
measure used to approximate RV.  Realized volatility is defined as the square root of 
squared returns over the time horizon, such that: 
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     ,    (3.7)
 
where 1ln( ) ln( )t t tR P P   , and Pt and Pt-1 are prices of the underlying futures contract. 
RV calculations were converted to an annualized basis such that:      
     
2
, 1 *52realized t tR   .                (3.8) 
For example, the April 1985 live cattle contract was trading at 63.67 on 3/13/1985 and 
62.00 on 3/20/1985; annualized realized volatility for the 3/13/1985 observation is 
19.2%.   
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 Care is taken to keep volatility calculations consistent during contract rollovers.  
Otherwise, there would be noticeable increases in RV if returns are measured between 
two different contracts.  When the nearby contract is rolled over in the dataset, the RV for 
the last contract observation is calculated from future prices of the same contract.  For 
example, the live cattle 1985 April contract expired on 3/22/1985.  The last observation 
in the weekly IV series for live cattle 1985 April contract was on 3/13/1985.  To calculate 
RV, futures prices for live cattle 1985 April contract on 3/20/1985 are used.  In the 
weekly series, the rollover on 3/20/1985 switches to the live cattle 1985 June contract.  
Thus, the RV for this observation is calculated using live cattle 1985 June prices on 
3/20/1985 and 3/27/1985. 
3.3.3 GARCH Forecast Volatility 
General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) models are frequently 
used as time-series alternative forecasts to IV.  ARCH models forecast the conditional 
variance of the error term as a function of previous time period’s squared returns, while 
GARCH models specify conditional variance as a function of both the previous time 
periods’ squared returns and lagged conditional variance.  If option markets are 
informationally efficient, IV should encompass information gleaned from past returns, 
including information uncovered by GARCH techniques (Figlewski 1997). 
GARCH models are used to construct one-week ahead forecasts of RV.  The first 
one-week ahead volatility forecast is generated after four years of option trading data 
existed for the commodity.  This is done to allow sufficient observations to develop the 
GARCH specifications.  GARCH volatility forecasts are generated using STATA.  
GARCH forecast volatilities are recursively generated out-of-sample, so that only 
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information at that point is used to estimate the next week’s volatility.  For example, only 
the first 500 observations are used in predicting the forecast volatility for observation 
501.   
One of the most simple GARCH models is a GARCH(1,1) with zero-mean 
specification.  This GARCH version is widely used in previous research (Szakmary 2003, 
Manfredo and Sanders 2004) as an alternative forecast to IV. In this version, the mean 
return, 1ln( ) ln( )t t tR P P   , is modeled as: 
2,  ~ (0, )t t t tR N h    ,    (3.9) 
where Rt is the return on the underlying asset, µ is the mean return (set to zero), εt is the 
error term, and ht2 is the conditional variance.  The next equation used in constructing 
GARCH(1,1) volatility  forecasts models the squared residuals as the past period’s 
squared returns and lagged conditional volatility:  
2 2 2
1 1t t th h      ,    (3.10) 
where h2t  is the conditional variance, ε2t-1 is the lagged error squared and  h2t-1 is the 
lagged conditional variance. In equation 3.10, the ARCH component consists of γε2t-1, 
while the GARCH component is θ h2t-1.   Equation 3.10 is transformed to produce an 
annualized forecast volatility by:  
2
, 1 *52t GARCH t th    .    (3.11) 
 Despite the evidence that GARCH(1,1) zero-mean specification models may be 
satisfactory alternative forecasts of realized volatility (Szakmary 2003), several additional 
GARCH models are also examined.  These models may be able to better account for 
factors such as non-normality, seasonality in returns, etc. than the GARCH(1,1) zero-
mean version, and may function as a stronger alternative forecast to IV.  To begin with, a 
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GARCH(1,1) zero-mean specification model with a t-distribution to allow for non-
normality is examined.  After four years of observations accrue to identify initial 
specifications and parameters, another model is explored in which the GARCH (p,q) and 
mean specification structures can vary.  Possible mean specification structures can  
include lagged returns such that:  
2
0 ,  ~ (0, )t n t n t t tR R N h      ,    (3.12) 
where Rt-n is the return in a prior period.  Here, the mean (max=AR(4)) and (p,q) 
(max=p=q=2) structure is identified and estimated yearly, and then used to forecast the 
weekly observations for that year, updating the parameter estimates after each 
observation.  At the end of the year, the mean and (p,q) structure is re-assessed, and the 
process continues.  Additional GARCH versions allowed for seasonality in returns, which 
is done by constructing dummy variables for contract or monthly effects in the mean 
return equation.   
  In addition to the aforementioned GARCH models, the performance of Threshold 
GJR GARCH (1,1), Asymmetric GARCH (1,1), and Generalized Error Distribution 
(GED) GARCH (1,1) models is tested.  In these models, the process of estimating, 
forecasting one-step ahead, adding a new observation, and re-estimating is followed once 
again.  A Threshold GARCH allows for deterministic seasonal contract volatility and 
asymmetric behavior triggered by whether error in the returns equation is less than zero, 
which has been shown to perform well in agricultural commodities (Simon, 2002; 
Isengildina, Irwin, and Good, 2006). Generalized Error Distribution GARCH models use 
a probability density function where tails are modeled based on a shape parameter 
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estimated.  If the parameter is less than two, the distribution tails are modeled as thicker 
than the normal distribution.   
A metric to judge the strength of GARCH models is needed to determine which 
GARCH version is most appropriate to select as the alternate forecast to IV. Both 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) are 
commonly used statistics to gauge model strength.  BIC statistics will generally select 
more parsimonious model specifications than AIC because marginal costs of adding 
regressors are greater with BIC (Enders 1994, pp. 88-89).  Also, BIC has superior large 
sample properties as it is asymptotically consistent, while AIC is biased towards over 
parameterization. The BIC statistic is selected as the chosen metric due to a preference of 
model simplicity and the large sample sizes found in our study.  As a result, all mean 
specifications and GARCH models are ranked based on BIC statistics. The BIC statistic 
is calculated as:  
2*ln ln( )BIC L k n         (3.13) 
where L is the maximum likelihood function value, k is the number of regressors, and n is 
the number of observations.  The model with the lowest BIC value is the preferred model 
to use as an alternative forecast to IV.   
3.3.4 Forecast Evaluation  
Several procedures are used to evaluate and characterize volatilities and their forecast 
errors.  Before running regressions between forecasts, it may be useful to first determine 
if the performance between forecasts is statistically different.  This is accomplished by 
running a Modified Diebold Mariano (MDM) test.  MDM tests are applied to mean 
absolute error and mean squared error: 
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where σforecast is the annualized forecast volatility and σreal is the annualized realized 
volatility.  Once these values are calculated, an MDM statistic can be calculated as 
follows: 
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where dt=g(et,1)-g(et,2), (et,1) is the error of the IV forecast, (et,2) is the error of the 
GARCH forecast, and d is the average difference over the time series.  The MDM values 
found are then compared with the critical values found in the Student’s t distribution. 
It may be useful to determine if the magnitude of forecast errors has been 
increasing or decreasing in magnitude over time.  This could be due to improvement or 
deterioration in the forecast’s performance, or from changes in the underlying asset’s 
systemic volatility.  Changes in forecast error magnitudes are tested by: 
1 2 2( )                : 0t t t oe trend H        .    (3.17) 
If θ2 is statistically significant, then the magnitude of forecast absolute errors has been 
changing over time.  
Several regression-type procedures are run testing forecast bias, efficiency, and 
encompassing of IV and GARCH forecasts. Bias can be tested by determining if the 
forecast error, calculated as RV minus forecast volatility, is statistically significant. 
Forecasts that consistently overestimate subsequent RV are upwardly biased forecasts, 
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while downwardly biased forecasts underestimate RV.  Forecast efficiency is tested 
through joint null hypotheses on regression coefficients, and by determining if 
autocorrelation is present in regression residuals.  A forecast encompasses a competing 
forecast if the addition of the competing forecast does not significantly improve the 
forecast error of the preferred forecast.   
 The first regression tests for forecast bias using: 
                        , , 1 1( )           : 0t realized t forecast t t oe H         ,    (3.18)  
where et is the forecast error, γ1 is the forecast bias, and µt is mean return.  If γ1 is 
significantly positive (negative) then the forecast is downwardly (upwardly) biased.  A 
more complete test of forecast bias and efficiency is shown in equation 3.19,  
                              , ,          : 1realized t forecast t t oH            ,  (3.19) 
where α is a level of  volatility that the forecast is unable to explain.  If the null 
hypothesis in 3.19 is rejected, then we conclude that the forecast is biased and inefficient.     
Addition of an alternative forecast yields equation 3.20, which tests for efficiency and 
bias as well: 
 , , ,          : 1, 0realized t IV t GARCH t t oH                 .  (3.20) 
If β2 is statistically significant, IV is an inefficient forecast since the alternative forecast 
provides additional information in forecasting realized volatility.  Autocorrelation in 
regression residuals is tested by the Portmanteau test: 
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
    ,     (3.21) 
where Q is the Portmanteau test statistic, n is the number of observations, s is the number 
of coefficients to test autocorrelation, and r is the autocorrelation coefficient for lag k.  
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For purposes of testing, Newey-West standard errors are used in all regressions, which 
adjust the standard errors and confidence intervals of the coefficients for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity. 
Forecast encompassing is tested with the following regression:                       
    1 1 2( )           : 0t t t t oe e e H       ,               
(3.22) 
where e1t is the preferred forecast error and e2t  is competing forecast error.  The default 
regression has IV as the preferred forecast and GARCH as the alternative.  If λ is 
statistically significant, then the preferred forecast does not encompass the competing 
because the addition of the alternative forecast could reduce the average error of the 
preferred forecast.  If λ is not statistically significant, then the preferred forecast 
encompasses the alternative forecast.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports empirical returns to buy and hold trading strategies in live and feeder 
cattle options and analysis of the performance of volatility forecasts. Section 4.1 presents 
empirical option returns using the Efficient Market Hypothesis as a benchmark for 
evaluating option pricing efficiency.  Section 4.2 discusses the performance of implied 
volatility and GARCH forecasts in predicting subsequent one-week realized volatility.   
 
4.1 Empirical Returns  
4.1.1 Summary Statistics and Pooled Returns 
The following sections provide an in-depth description of empirical option returns across 
option types and holding periods.  The eight subsets of options examined were thirty- and 
ninety-day live cattle calls and puts, and thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle calls and 
puts.  Table 1 shows returns and general statistics, while Tables 2-9 present more detailed 
statistics such as skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera (JB) and Sharpe Ratio statistics for 
individual option subsets.   
Standard deviations for both dollar and percent returns were larger in call options 
than puts, and larger in feeder cattle than live cattle.  Skewness, kurtosis, and standard 
deviations in percent returns increased as options became more out-of-the money (OTM), 
while standard deviations in dollar returns increased as options became more in-the-
money (ITM).  OTM option moneyness bins generally had higher volume than ITM bins.  
All options failed Jarque-Bera tests of normality, thus bootstrapping procedures were 
used to generate return confidence intervals.   
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Figures 6 and 7 display dollar return histograms for thirty-day live cattle puts and 
thirty-day feeder cattle calls.  Both option subsets are clearly non-normally distributed, 
and the higher density of negative returns is more apparent in thirty-day live cattle puts.  
Additional histograms of dollar and percent returns in other option subsets are found in 
the Appendix.    
The analysis of pooled returns from option subsets revealed patterns across 
holding periods and commodities.  For live cattle, in both thirty- and ninety-day holding 
periods, calls had marginally positive returns that were not large enough to be statistically 
significant (Tables 1-3).   Thirty-day calls averaged a return of $26.16, while ninety-day 
calls averaged $53.33.  While these returns are positive, they are not statistically 
significant as zero falls within the 95% confidence intervals for both of these subsets, (-
18, 71) and (-37, 143), respectively.  This same pattern occurs in percent returns, where 
thirty- and ninety-day calls had returns of -3.27% and 7.27%, with confidence intervals of 
(-17,11) and (-9,23).  Live cattle thirty- and ninety-day calls were the only option subsets 
that could be considered efficiently priced in both dollar and percent returns.  
 Significant dollar and percent losses were incurred in thirty- and ninety-day live 
cattle put options (Tables 1, 4-5).  Thirty- and ninety-day puts averaged returns of -
$143.21 and -$226.43, with confidence intervals of (-180,-106) and (-351,-183).  Percent 
returns averaged -41.54% and -26.95%, respectively in thirty- and ninety-day horizons, 
with confidence intervals of (-50, -33) and (-44, -12).  For option buyers, live cattle put 
option returns were the worse performing in both dollar and percentage terms.  
For feeder cattle, significant positive returns were present in thirty- and ninety-
day calls (Tables 1, 6-7).  Thirty-day feeder calls averaged returns of $244.82, and 
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ninety-day $246.90.  The corresponding confidence intervals were (175,314) and 
(115,379).  Thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle calls achieved returns of 34.92% and 
30.50%, with confidence intervals of (15,55) and (9,52). Feeder cattle calls were the best 
performing option subset for option buyers.   
Thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle puts had significant negative dollar and 
percent returns (Tables 1,8-9).  Thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle puts averaged returns 
of -$89.44 and -$202.89, with confidence intervals of (-146, -32) and (-297, -109).  
Percent returns averaged -27.91% and -19.07%, respectively in thirty and ninety-day 
horizons, with confidence intervals of (-40, -16) and (-36, -2).  While feeder cattle put 
returns were significantly negative, the level of losses on both dollar and percent returns 
was smaller in magnitude than live cattle puts.  For example, thirty-day live cattle puts 
lost 41.54% on average, while thirty-day feeder cattle puts lost 27.91%. 
Sharpe ratios are displayed in Tables 2-9 for the eight option subsets, and are 
shown from the buyers’ perspective.  Sharpe Ratios for live cattle calls were close to 
zero, while feeder cattle calls had the highest Sharpe Ratio, .12. All four put option 
subsets had negative Sharpe Ratios, with thirty-day live cattle puts the most negative at -
.30.  According to Sharpe Ratios calculated, the most advantageous options for buyers to 
purchase would be thirty-day feeder cattle calls, and  the most profitable options for 
sellers would be thirty-day live cattle puts. 
Comparison of returns by moneyness bins does not reveal additional insight from 
analysis of pooled returns.  Confidence intervals for individual moneyness bins (Tables 
2-9) generally supported the conclusions found from pooled returns.  One of the few 
patterns from moneyness bins that emerged was higher dollar returns as call options 
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became more ITM (Figure 8).  If patterns were present, thirty-day returns tended to 
exhibit clearer patterns across moneyness bins than ninety-day returns.  However, most 
charts of moneyness bins produced no strong patterns, as seen in live cattle put percent 
returns in Figure 9.  Additional moneyness charts are shown in the Appendix.  
4.1.2 Empirical Returns in Early and Later Periods 
Patterns emerged in empirical returns when options were divided into two historical 
periods, before October 2003, the early period, and the later period, afterwards.  Table 10 
shows that both thirty- and ninety-day live cattle put dollar returns became more 
negative, while thirty-day live cattle calls became slightly negative and ninety-day live 
cattle calls became more positive in the later period.  As a result, three of the four live 
cattle option subsets had returns that deteriorated from the early to the later period. The 
additional mispricing in the later period seems to be more severe in thirty-day live cattle 
options, especially if percent returns are considered.  Only thirty-day live cattle calls in 
the early period were significantly positive, with an average return of $56.54 and an 
associated 95% confidence interval of (8,106).  Both thirty and ninety-day live cattle puts 
averaged significant negative returns in the early and later periods. Thirty-day live cattle 
put returns decreased from -$112.79 to -$228.56, while ninety-day puts decreased from -
$214.58 to -$271.95.  
Figures 10-13 plot individual dollar returns from live cattle call and put option 
observations.  The black vertical line in these figures indicates the dividing point in 
October 2003. Live cattle call returns seem evenly dispersed around zero, with increased 
dispersion in the later period that still seems centered around zero.  On the other hand, 
puts clearly contain heavier distributions of negative returns, even in the earlier period.  
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There is a noticeable decline in put returns in the later period, and this decline is more 
pronounced in thirty-day horizons.  Put returns may be returning to “normal” in recent 
years, yet normal returns in live cattle puts appear to be significantly negative.  Figures 
plotting annual average dollar returns are found in the Appendix.  
Figure 14 shows the behavior over time of a live cattle put option that was trading 
during the periods of extreme volatility in 2003 and 2004.  This put option was an OTM 
put on December 23, 2003 corresponding with the April 2004 contract, and had a $76/cwt 
strike price.  Futures prices were above $90/cwt immediately preceding the December 
23announcement. On December 26, 2003, the first day of full trading after the BSE case 
was reported, the time value of this option skyrocketed from about $3.5/cwt to $9.5/cwt.  
This translates into a $2400 increase in the premium paid to purchase this option.  
However, the option expired worthless as market prices rebounded quickly based on the 
limited nature of the outbreak and the measures taken by the USDA to minimize the risk 
of future BSE cases. 
Both thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle calls and puts achieved higher returns in 
the later period as seen in Table 10.  Dollar and percent returns increased markedly in 
feeder cattle calls.  For example, thirty-day feeder cattle dollar returns increased from 
$94.85 in the early period to $562.05 in the later period and percent returns from 7.38% 
to 93.15%.  Similarly, ninety-day feeder cattle returns increased dramatically in the later 
period, from $78.81 to $786.37 and 10.03% to 96.18%.  Feeder cattle put returns were 
negative in the early period, but returns improved enough in the later period to contain 
zero in confidence intervals, suggesting efficient pricing in recent years.  For example, 
ninety-day feeder cattle puts returned $-248.19 in the early period and -$64.57 in the later 
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period.  Figures 15-18 plot individual feeder cattle option call and put returns over time.  
Strong positive profits in feeder cattle calls seem to emerge from a few large price spikes 
in feeder cattle futures prices, and these profits seem to have moderated in recent years, 
even though higher volatility is still present in the futures price series (Figure 2).  This 
suggests that option writers have more effectively incorporated these volatility 
expectations in recent years, while the initial price run-ups in 2003 and 2004 may have 
been unexpected by option writers. Inspection of live and feeder cattle futures price series 
(Figures 1 and 2) reveals that feeder cattle prices clearly behave differently in the later 
period, while the change in live cattle futures price movement is not as clear-cut.  The 
decline that occurs in 2003-2004 in feeder cattle put returns is not as visible and drastic as 
in live cattle puts, which may suggest that shocks to the market were larger in live cattle.  
Indeed, one year after the December 2003 BSE case, live cattle futures prices had 
declined eighteen percent, while feeder cattle prices declined thirteen percent.  
Another avenue to explore the significance of possible mispricing of live and 
feeder cattle options is to determine how the amount of mispricing compares to the value 
of the underlying commodity.  Table 11 displays a “heat map” that indicates how much 
overpriced (underpriced) option initial premiums would have to drop (rise) to be 
considered efficiently priced.  The amount of change in initial option premiums needed to 
find zero dollar returns and zero dollar returns based on the confidence intervals is 
calculated.  Darker shades of red indicate heavier overpricing, while deeper shades of 
green indicate significant under-pricing. The consistent overpricing in live cattle puts, 
regardless of time period examined, is clearly evident in the heat map.  Alternatively, 
only in the later period does large under-pricing of feeder cattle calls occur.  In thirty-day 
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live cattle puts, initial option premiums would have to drop by $0.36/cwt to average 
dollar returns of zero.  The average live cattle nearby futures price over the data range 
was about $74/cwt, so the overpricing in thirty-day live cattle puts represents about one 
half a percent of the value of the underlying commodity.   
4.1.3 Short Straddle Returns Analysis 
Results from short straddle positions (Table 12) display significant positive returns from 
live cattle thirty-day straddles of $160.07 and 14.21%, and insignificant returns from live 
cattle ninety-day and feeder cattle thirty- and ninety-day straddles.  When short straddles 
are simulated, the influences of futures price level and movements are neutralized.  
Consequently, these results suggest that overpricing of live cattle thirty-day options is too 
large to have been caused solely by upward drifts in cattle futures prices.  On the other 
hand, significant returns from ninety-day live cattle puts and thirty- and ninety-day feeder 
cattle calls appear to have been caused predominantly from movements in underlying 
futures prices, since profits evaporate when straddles of matching holding periods are 
constructed.   
The level of overpricing in live cattle thirty-day short straddles increased 
markedly in the later period, where dollar returns increased from $100.44 in the early 
period to $438.33 in the later period.  Live cattle straddle returns were almost significant 
in the early period, while strong significance emerged in the later period.  This pattern in 
straddle returns is illustrated in Figure 19, which shows an upward shift in straddle 
returns in the later period. The strongest positive returns are found in the immediate 
aftermath of the December 2003 BSE case, which may indicate that path peso problems 
were part of the larger overpricing of these options in the later period.  If a path peso 
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problem was present, the market overestimated the likelihood of future catastrophic BSE 
outbreaks.  While there were more than a dozen additional North American BSE cases 
after 2003, none were catastrophic since much of the damage to export markets and 
domestic demand had already occurred from earlier cases.  Another possible 
manifestation of overpricing is the presence of volatility risk premiums in live cattle 
thirty-day options.  There is evidence of a risk premium in most of the live cattle thirty-
day data, as straddle profits in the early period were significant at the ten-percent 
significance level.  In sum, straddle results indicate that if option pricing problems such 
as path peso problems and volatility risk premiums are present, they are more pervasive 
and significant in shorter-term horizons in live cattle options.  
 4.1.4 Transaction Costs 
In recent years, option transaction costs have decreased to around twenty-five dollars per 
contract (Jackson 2005).  Transaction costs were higher in earlier periods of the dataset, 
so average transaction costs of forty-dollars per option contract are likely suitable. 
Liquidity costs are more difficult to measure, and are most likely larger in feeder cattle 
markets due to lower volume.  Nonetheless, transaction costs would have to be over 
$100, several times larger than realistic levels, to erase significant profits found from 
selling live and feeder cattle puts and buying feeder cattle calls. Thus, the level of 
transaction costs has almost no implication on findings of pricing efficiency when call or 
put positions are considered.  Transaction costs would average around eighty-dollars for 
short straddles, due to two options being traded.  Live cattle thirty-day straddles averaged 
returns of $160, so liquidity costs would have to exceed eight ticks to erase profits found 
in these straddles.   
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4.1.5 Empirical Returns Summary 
Empirical returns from thirty- and ninety-day live and feeder cattle options suggest 
significant profits are present from selling live and feeder cattle puts or buying feeder 
cattle calls.  The persistence and level of profits from selling put options was stronger in 
live cattle than feeder cattle.  Findings on pricing efficiency were relatively consistent 
between dollar and percent returns, especially when all observations were used.  When 
percent returns are used, the level of significant returns in puts and feeder cattle calls is 
more severe in thirty-day options than ninety-day.  The level of transaction costs has little 
or no implication on significance of returns, since most confidence intervals are strongly 
different from zero.  Results from short straddles indicate that significant returns in live 
cattle thirty-day options are inexplicable based solely on futures price movements, while 
returns from live cattle ninety-day and feeder cattle thirty-and ninety-day options can be 
explained from drifts in futures prices.  As such, path peso problems or volatility risk 
premiums could explain some of the over-pricing in live cattle thirty-day options, while 
other options are not “mispriced” after futures price movements are considered.   
 
4.2 Volatility Forecasting Results  
4.2.1 Summary Statistics  
 
Summary statistics in Table 13 indicate that for both live and feeder cattle, realized 
volatility had a smaller mean but larger variability than both implied volatility and 
GARCH(1,1) t distribution forecasts. The GARCH (1,1) t version was chosen as the 
preferred GARCH model to use as an alternative forecast as it allows for non-normality. 
Both average levels of volatilities and differences between realized and forecasted 
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volatilities were larger for live cattle than feeder cattle.  Live cattle RV averaged .103, IV 
.146, and GARCH .133.  Feeder cattle RV averaged .087, IV .106, and GARCH .113.  
Realized volatility’s standard deviations and coefficients of variation (CV) were much 
larger than either volatility forecast in both commodities.  For example, live cattle RV 
had a CV of .932 while live cattle IV had .315 and GARCH .376.  This suggests that IV 
and GARCH forecasts may have poorly forecasted the right tail thickness of the RV 
distribution.  This possibility is supported by live cattle volatility histograms found in 
Figures 20-22, which depict heavier densities of RV distributions in the right tail, 
especially in volatility levels above .30.  Notice that volatility measures are bounded by 
zero, since negative volatilities are not possible.  Additional volatility histograms are 
found in the Appendix.  Correlation statistics demonstrate that correlations between 
forecasts were stronger than correlations between forecasts and RV (Table 14).  
Correlations between GARCH and RV were lower than correlations between IV and RV.   
Higher correlations between IV and RV suggest that IV is a stronger forecast of RV than 
GARCH. 
 Efforts to generate improved GARCH formulations were not productive, 
particularly in live cattle, and failed to produce out-of-sample forecasts appreciably 
different from a GARCH(1,1) t-distribution model.  Mean volatilities were largely the 
same between GARCH forecasts, and negligible differences were seen in regressions run 
testing GARCH forecast performance (Table 15 and Appendix).  Allowing for different 
mean and (p,q) structures and error distribution specifications (GED, etc) permitted 
flexibility in live and feeder cattle markets, but failed to reduce forecast errors.  Little 
evidence of seasonal effects in contract or monthly terms was found in live and feeder 
56 
 
cattle returns (Appendix).  The only significant seasonality found was in several feeder 
cattle contracts, but this vanished when monthly effects were tested.  Use of the 
TGARCH(1,1) with deterministic contract seasonality was ineffective in the live cattle 
market for long stretches of the data, indicating the model’s incompatibility with the data.  
TGARCH(1,1) worked better in the feeder cattle market, but again did not appreciably 
improve forecasts.  Similar patterns occurred with Asymmetric GARCH models, which 
did not converge in live cattle for large parts of the data due to flat log likelihoods 
encountered in model estimation.  As a result, discussion is focused on the volatility 
forecasts generated by the GARCH(1,1) t-distribution model. 
Figures 23-24 plot RV and IV series over time in live and feeder cattle.  The most 
identifiable picture in these figures is the large spike in volatility that occurred in 
December 2003.  Realized volatility measures vary more week to week than IV.  This is 
seen more clearly when a shorter period of data is focused on in Figures 4-5.  After the 
volatility spikes in 2003, there is a higher mean level of realized and implied volatility in 
both markets.  This observation from Figures 4 and 5 is corroborated by statistics in 
Table 16, which show mean volatility levels did increase appreciably from the early 
period to the later period.  In live cattle, mean RV increased from .094 to .132, and in 
feeder cattle from .077 to .117.  Live cattle volatility forecasts increased more than RV 
from the early to later period, while feeder cattle volatility forecasts increased less than 
RV. 
4.2.2 Forecast Bias and Efficiency 
There is strong statistical evidence in Table 17 that IV and GARCH are upwardly biased 
forecasters of RV for both live and feeder cattle.  Forecast errors are calculated as RV 
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minus forecast volatility, thus the significant negative γ values presented indicate that RV 
was overstated by both forecasts.  The overstatement is greatest with live cattle IV, which 
overstated RV by an average of .044 during all years.  Feeder cattle IV overstatement of 
RV was .0189, which while statistically significant, is less than half the error seen in live 
cattle.  The amount of volatility overstatement was smaller in live cattle in the early 
period than the later period, while in feeder cattle volatility overstatement decreased in 
the later period.  For example, live cattle implied volatility forecast errors increased in 
magnitude from -.041 to -.052 between periods, while feeder cattle IV forecast errors 
improved from -.019 to -.016.  The same pattern in forecast error between periods occurs 
in GARCH forecasts between commodities as well.   The smaller nature of forecast errors 
in feeder cattle is displayed in Figure 25, which depicts live and feeder cattle IV forecast 
errors.  Almost all of the largest negative forecast errors occur with live cattle 
observations, while large positive errors are somewhat mixed between live and feeder 
cattle.   
Figures 26-27 plot live and feeder cattle IV and GARCH annual average weekly 
forecast errors over time.  For almost all of the live cattle series, IV had a larger forecast 
error than GARCH, which is consistent with the statistics found.  In contrast, feeder cattle 
IV and GARCH errors are similar until about 1998, after which IV seemed to improve 
versus GARCH.  In 2004, all forecasts had large increases in errors after the BSE 
outbreaks, but the increases in forecast error magnitudes were much larger in GARCH 
than IV.  For example, average live cattle GARCH forecasts errors increased in 
magnitude from +.01 in 2003 to -.09 in 2004, while live cattle IV forecast error averaged 
about -.025 in 2003 and -.06 in 2004.  The poorer performance of GARCH forecasts in 
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2004 suggests IV could more rapidly react to a new market dynamic like the mad-cow 
outbreak than GARCH forecasts.  This seems logical because traders pricing the options 
should have quickly priced in the effect of the outbreak announcement and the likelihood 
of subsequent outbreaks, which would be reflected in implied volatilities of the options 
trading at that point in time.  On the other hand, GARCH forecasts would still use all past 
price data for calculating volatility forecasts, even if a fundamental shift had occurred in 
cattle markets. 
While GARCH forecasts deteriorated sharply in 2004, forecast errors rebounded 
quickly in both live and feeder cattle.  After 2004, it appears that live cattle GARCH 
forecast errors rebounded to smaller levels than IV forecast errors, which remained at 
around -.06 even by 2007.  The level of shocks that occurred to live and feeder cattle 
markets during 2003 and 2004 was quite severe.  In a normally functioning market, the 
put-call parity should require that call and put option IV’s with the same strike and 
maturity are equal.  Figure 28 shows deviations from the put-call parity over time in live 
and feeder cattle.  There were minor aberrations from the parity in parts of the time-
series, but the put-call parity was thrown into disarray during late 2003 and early 2004. 
Results from Table 18 demonstrate that the magnitude of absolute forecast errors 
was increasing with time.  These findings imply that there has been a systematic increase 
in volatility and/or a concurrent reduction in the forecasting ability of IV and GARCH.  
Statistics from Table 16 and 17 concur that there has been an increase in systemic 
volatility, and in live cattle the forecasting ability of IV and GARCH forecasts did 
deteriorate in the later period, as evidenced by larger forecast errors.   
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MDM test results shown in Table 19 suggest that the forecast performance 
between IV and GARCH forecasts was different in both markets, especially when all 
years were considered.  MAE values were positive in live cattle, which suggest that 
GARCH errors were smaller than IV.  Alternatively, in feeder cattle significant negative 
MAE values indicate that GARCH errors were larger than IV.   These findings reinforce 
earlier statistics (Table 17) that concluded GARCH errors were smaller than respective 
IV errors in live cattle and larger in feeder cattle.  When MAE values between periods are 
examined, little difference between forecasts was found in live cattle, while feeder cattle 
had significant negative MAE values in both the early and later periods.  When MSE 
values are considered, almost all statistics were negative, which means squared errors 
from GARCH forecasts were larger than IV squared errors in both commodities.  Overall, 
MDM statistics offer sufficient evidence that IV and GARCH forecasts were significantly 
different. 
Results from regression type procedures testing forecast bias and efficiency are 
shown in Table 20.  The higher predictive power found from IV forecasts is another 
indicator that IV is a better performing forecast, even in live cattle where GARCH may 
add some marginal information. Adjusted R2 values indicate that IV has several times the 
predictive power of GARCH forecasts in both markets.  For example, in live cattle when 
IV is sole forecast used, the adjusted R2 is .232, compared to .08 when GARCH is the 
sole forecasts.  Adjusted R2 values improve slightly in live cattle when both forecasts are 
combined, while no improvement is found in feeder cattle.  In fact, in the early period, 
adjusted R2 values decreased in feeder cattle when both forecasts were used.  
Additionally, in the early period for live cattle, the beta value in Regression 3 for 
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GARCH forecasts (-.378) is significantly negative, implying that GARCH forecasts 
added information in forecasting RV.  The live cattle GARCH beta coefficient in 
Regression 3 increased in magnitude to -.459 in the later period and -.419 in all years.  
However, the conclusion of statistical significance in GARCH forecasts is not found in 
the later period or in all years, most likely due to wider confidence intervals caused by 
higher volatility in the later period.3   
Joint null hypotheses, used to assess forecast bias and efficiency, are strongly 
rejected in both markets (Table 20).   These rejections result in conclusions that IV and 
GARCH are biased, inefficient forecasts in both markets.  Even though some alpha and 
beta coefficients by themselves are not significantly different from zero and one, when 
both are combined they are soundly rejected. For example, even though the β1 value in 
the first live cattle regression was 1.012, the alpha coefficient was so negative that 
assuming it is zero makes the odds of β1 being one extremely unlikely.  The significant 
alpha values in these regressions suggest that there is some level of realized volatility that 
both forecasts are unable to predict.   This level of volatility increases markedly in the 
later period.  For example, in live cattle alpha values in Regression 3 increase in 
magnitude from -.013 in the earlier period to -.086 in the later period.  Thus, it appears 
that the amount of volatility that forecasts are unable to predict has increased 
significantly in the later period. 
Autocorrelation is another measure to test for forecast efficiency, since forecasts 
with autocorrelation suggest previous information could improve forecasts.  Portmanteau 
tests run on regression residuals found evidence of autocorrelation in live cattle, but not 
                                                 
3 Newey-West standard errors, which compensate for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation were 
used in determinations of statistical significance.  
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in feeder cattle when all years were considered (Table 20).  Patterns in autocorrelation 
change when periods are considered.  In the early period, autocorrelation is present in 
feeder cattle residuals but not in live cattle.  In the later period, autocorrelation is found in 
live cattle but not in feeder cattle.   
4.2.3 Forecast Encompassing 
In both live and feeder cattle, forecast errors of the preferred forecast, IV, were not 
significantly improved with the addition of errors from the competing forecast, GARCH, 
as evidenced by insignificant lambda values (Table 21).  If lambda values were 
significant, then the preferred forecast would not encompass the competing forecast.  
However, in the early period, live cattle’s lambda value, -.408, came close to being 
statistically significant.  P-values for lambda statistics in the early period in live cattle 
were .10, .18 in the later period, and .13 in all years.  Once again, evidence surfaces of 
possible marginal information that GARCH forecasts may add in live cattle realized 
volatility forecasting.  In contrast, GARCH forecasts are not close to being significant in 
feeder cattle, with lambda p-values at .36 for the early period, .42 for the later period, and 
.67 for all years.   
4.2.4. Volatility Forecasting Summary 
Implied volatility was found to be a biased, inefficient forecast of RV in both 
commodities.  Implied volatility and GARCH forecasts were upwardly biased, and 
overstatement of RV from IV forecasts was more than twice as severe in live cattle 
markets.  Despite these shortcomings, IV did encompass GARCH forecasts, although 
some evidence of marginal information added from GARCH forecasts was found in live 
cattle.  Most findings on forecast bias, efficiency, and encompassing did not differ when 
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varying time periods were examined.  All mean volatility measures increased markedly in 
the later period, during which live cattle forecast errors worsened while feeder cattle 
forecast errors improved.  Even though live and feeder cattle IV forecasts of subsequent 
realized volatility are biased and inefficient, the usefulness of including additional time-
series alternatives such as GARCH models in forecasting RV appears limited.   
 
4.3 Tables and Figures  
 
 
 
Commodity, 
Holding Period, 
and Option Mean SD
Confidence 
Interval Mean SD
Confidence 
Interval
Live Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 26.16  722.31 (-18,71) -3.27  222.75 (-17,11)
Ninety-day Calls 53.33  1207.90 (-37,143) 7.27  211.35 (-9,23)
Thirty-day Puts -143.21* 579.26 (-180,-106) -41.54* 137.29 (-50,-33)
Ninety-day Puts -226.43* 972.24 (-351,-183) -26.95* 222.81 (-44,-12)
Feeder Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 244.82* 1009.14 (175,314) 34.92* 289.96 (15,55)
Ninety-day Calls 246.90* 1662.54 (115,379) 30.50* 282.65 (9,52)
Thirty-day Puts -89.44* 853.40 (-146,-32) -27.91* 185.26 (-40,-16)
Ninety-day Puts -202.89* 1268.39 (-297,-109) -19.97* 222.08 (-36,-2)
Table 1. Live and Feeder Cattle Empirical Returns
Dollar Returns Percent Returns
Live Cattle data range from 1/1985 to 1/2008 and  Feeder Cattle from 3/1987 to 1/2008. An 
asterisk (*) indicates returns differ from zero at 5% level. Confidence intervals are generated 
using a bootstrapping procedure.
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0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return 164.46 119.19 12.24 -47.62 -38.91 26.16
95% C.I. (-33,362) (-12,250) (-74,99) (-104,9) (-99,21) (-18,71)
Standard Deviation 1069.42 925.54 723.61 467.94 379.05 722.31
Skewness 0.35 0.59 1.77 3.39 4.07 1.38
Kurtosis 0.32 0.80 4.23 14.94 17.74 3.85
Jarque-Bera statistic 36.50 47.67 151.21 2080.40 1749.73 335.60
Percent Return 9.46 11.06 2.27 -21.82 -7.29 -3.27
95% C.I. (-1,20) (-1,23) (-15,19) (-48,4) (-75,61) (-17,11)
Standard Deviation 58.32 83.87 139.82 220.89 438.64 222.75
Skewness .60 .67 1.88 3.99 5.42 7.31
Kurtosis 1.38 .73 4.25 17.65 30.94 76.89
Jarque-Bera statistic 19.24 53.31 168.65 3074.54 5537.73 229098.09
Sharpe Ratio .16 .13 .02 -.10 -.02 -.01
Observations 114 183 259 265 148 969
Moneyness Bins
Table 2. Live Cattle Thirty-Day Call Option Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return 329.51 62.66 36.44 53.74 8.19 53.33
95% C.I. (-431,1090) (-270,395) (-149,221) (-68,176) (-96,112) (-37,143)
Standard Deviation 2381.35 1560.02 1311.71 955.75 717.17 1207.90
Skewness .87 .91 1.62 2.32 4.08 1.78
Kurtosis -.25 .98 2.97 6.89 18.70 4.55
Jarque-Bera statistic 20.35 27.86 83.09 343.38 2204.18 445.44
Percent Return 16.05 5.34 6.87 18.84 -8.54 7.27
95% C.I. (-19,51) (-17,28) (-15,29) (-12,50) (-50,33) (-9,23)
Standard Deviation 108.38 110.85 158.83 237.15 275.22 211.35
Skewness .83 .84 1.81 3.33 4.56 4.04
Kurtosis -.61 -.01 3.53 15.23 24.88 24.71
Jarque-Bera statistic 23.69 44.43 106.15 1816.62 3956.07 15866.56
Sharpe Ratio .15 .05 .04 .08 -.03 .03
Observations 36 90 190 225 169 710
Table 3. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Call Option Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
Moneyness Bins
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
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0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return -110.91 -131.98 -163.42 -136.35 -214.40 -143.21
95% C.I. (-128,-94) (-175,-89) (-237,-90) (-277,4) (-431,2) (-180,-106)
Standard Deviation 133.13 353.94 587.76 897.85 1020.92 579.26
Skewness 1.87 2.44 1.56 .65 .68 1.12
Kurtosis 17.01 9.51 2.84 -.31 -.28 3.27
Jarque-Bera statistic 2040.33 711.47 102.79 76.98 46.38 207.71
Percent Return -79.73 -45.05 -29.31 -12.74 -13.27 -41.54
95% C.I. (-98,-62) (-67,-23) (-44,-15) (-27,1) (-26,-1) (-50,-33)
Standard Deviation 142.39 177.70 120.21 85.90 61.01 137.29
Skewness 8.04 4.47 2.20 .80 .69 4.91
Kurtosis 66.33 22.54 5.58 -1.2 -.11 33.27
Jarque-Bera statistic 41451.14 4964.12 272.33 74.94 42.46 41241.59
Sharpe Ratio -.56 -.25 -.24 -.15 -.22 -.30
Observations 233 258 252 146 88 977
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
Table 4. Live Cattle Thirty-Day Put Option Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
Moneyness Bins
0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return -192.54 -134.46 -222.07 -331.87 -1038.75 -226.43
95% C.I. (-271,-114) (-260,-9) (-374,-70) (-633,-31) (-1659,-419) (-351,-183)
Standard Deviation 576.08 933.72 1074.89 1328.96 1539.65 972.74
Skewness 3.98 2.74 1.99 1.81 1.76 2.14
Kurtosis 19.02 8.68 4.75 4.36 3.70 7.06
Jarque-Bera statistic 2839.87 537.68 150.75 44.92 12.86 1022.44
Percent Return -46.08 -13.67 -18.52 -22.41 -52.51 -26.95
95% C.I. (-86,-6) (-45,17) (-41,4) (-49,4) (-84,-21) (-44,-12)
Standard Deviation 297.61 225.48 155.56 112.67 81.54 222.81
Skewness 9.57 4.68 3.22 2.10 2.06 8.46
Kurtosis 110.49 29.46 13.98 5.22 4.79 112.31
Jarque-Bera statistic 105794.90 6791.46 1289.36 67.78 20.16 360433.96
Sharpe Ratio -.15 -.06 -.12 -.20 -.64 -.12
Observations 213 207 191 72 24 707
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
Moneyness Bins
Table 5. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Put Option Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
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0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return 885.22 401.63 194.88 92.31 27.64 244.82
95% C.I. (475,1296) (178,625) (98,292) (16,168) (-47,102) (175,314)
Standard Deviation 1719.13 1357.51 893.79 597.25 328.15 1009.14
Skewness .33 .50 1.50 2.64 3.08 1.42
Kurtosis -.26 -.13 2.21 6.76 9.81 2.91
Jarque-Bera statistic 31.34 63.08 120.65 407.10 242.63 271.84
Percent Return 28.16 24.81 27.29 49.13 47.25 34.92
95% C.I. (14,43) (10,40) (9,46) (-7,105) (-65,160) (15,55)
Standard Deviation 60.73 92.00 163.58 430.98 475.98 289.96
Skewness .02 .51 1.78 4.84 3.81 6.14
Kurtosis -.41 -.18 3.96 28.23 14.23 51.13
Jarque-Bera statistic 33.01 65.13 169.46 7092.91 529.09 83281.97
Sharpe Ratio .46 .27 .17 .11 .10 .12
Observations 68 140 300 233 69 810
Table 6. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Call Option Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
Moneyness Bins
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return 241.52 689.71 241.92 181.75 102.76 246.90
95% C.I. (-834,1317) (197,1183) (-9,493) (-12,376) (-63,268) (115,379)
Standard Deviation 2916.61 2271.96 1756.80 1409.12 970.43 1662.54
Skewness .34 .84 1.70 2.896 3.96 1.76
Kurtosis -.25 -.01 2.89 9.70 18.83 4.18
Jarque-Bera statistic 12.88 37.55 86.93 659.31 1749.42 359.24
Percent Return 9.64 35.53 25.31 41.54 22.22 30.50
95% C.I. (-24,43) (8,63) (-3,54) (-5,88) (-38,82) (9,52)
Standard Deviation 89.02 122.01 191.29 345.68 362.38 282.65
Skewness .91 .81 2.61 4.17 4.07 4.55
Kurtosis 1.31 -.18 9.29 21.51 17.77 27.09
Jarque-Bera statistic 7.2 40.22 504.50 3504.30 1588.28 17212.66
Sharpe Ratio .11 .29 .13 .12 .06 .11
Observations 28 76 181 204 134 623
Table 7. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Call Option Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
Moneyness Bins
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
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0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return -96.29 -70.39 -70.84 -273.92 199.62 -89.44
95% C.I. (-129,-63) (-122,-19) (-169,28) (-485,-63) (-360,758) (-146,-32)
Standard Deviation 210.45 439.16 830.44 1226.15 2007.75 853.40
Skewness 3.38 2.48 1.56 .72 .92 1.63
Kurtosis 38.69 8.63 2.69 -.14 2.55 10.14
Jarque-Bera statistic 8576.60 664.93 110.69 64.20 7.51 2283.83
Percent Return -69.15 -25.57 -16.27 -20.41 5.06 -27.91
95% C.I. (-106,-32) (-51,0) (-34,1) (-36,-5) (-16,26) (-40,-16)
Standard Deviation 236.50 226.47 145.64 87.86 75.42 185.26
Skewness 8.57 4.54 2.01 .99 .89 5.88
Kurtosis 73.42 27.22 3.90 .28 1.79 50.82
Jarque-Bera statistic 34143.00 7863.33 191.06 61.51 10.10 89724.81
Sharpe Ratio -.29 -.11 -.11 -.23 .07 -.15
Observations 156 282 271 129 50 888
Table 8. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Put Option Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
Moneyness Bins
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
0.94 0.97 1 1.03 1.06 Pooled
Dollar Return -180.53 -214.99 -272.17 -198.61 299.44 -202.89
95% C.I. (-293,-68) (-376,-54) (-472,-72) (-641,244) (-769,1368) (-297,-109)
Standard Deviation 822.10 1177.84 1403.36 1744.76  2545.41 1268.39
Skewness 2.96 2.74 2.26 1.05 .13 2.06
Kurtosis 25.73 15.24 7.59 .19 -1.79 8.24
Jarque-Bera statistic 4805.69 1595.17 308.77 30.72 19.14 1260.95
Percent Return -20.79 -21.73 -19.48 -11.42 8.12 -19.07
95% C.I. (-61,20) (-50,7) (-42,3) (-40,17) (-34,51) (-36,-2)
Standard Deviation 301.21 214.35 150.00 109.42 100.76 222.08
Skewness 5.84 4.15 2.45 1.28 .23 5.77
Kurtosis 40.79 22.50 6.71 .87 -1.59 48.59
Jarque-Bera statistic 13623.55 3986.62 281.86 27.73 17.71 62754.24
Sharpe Ratio -.07 -.10 -.13 -.10 .08 -.09
Observations 209 213 179 60 20 681
Note: Confidence intervals are constructed using bootstrapping procedures.
Moneyness Bins
Table 9. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Put Option Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
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Commodity, 
Holding Period, 
and Option 
Early 
Period
Later 
Period
Early 
Period
Later 
Period
Early 
Period
Later 
Period
Live Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 56.54* -48.98  3.89  -21.01* 691 278
Ninety-day Calls 20.91  158.73  -1.19  34.77  554 156
Thirty-day Puts -112.79* -228.56* -36.44* -55.85* 721 256
Ninety-day Puts -214.58* -271.95* -27.98* -23.01  561 146
Feeder Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 94.85* 562.05* 7.38  93.15* 550 260
Ninety-day Calls 78.81  786.37* 10.03  96.18* 475 148
Thirty-day Puts -105.56* -51.96  -24.42* -36.03* 621 267
Ninety-day Puts -248.19* -64.57  -33.01* -23.52  514 167
Live Cattle data range from 1/1985 to 1/2008 and  Feeder Cattle from 3/1987 to 1/2008. 
Early period data range from start of data to September 2003.  Later period data range 
from October 2003 to January 2008. An asterisk (*) indicates returns differ from zero at 
Table 10. Live and Feeder Cattle Empirical Returns by Period
Dollar Returns Percent Returns Observations
Commodity 
and Holding 
Period
Zero 
average 
return
Zero in 
confidence 
interval
Zero 
average 
return
Zero in 
confidence 
interval
Zero 
average 
return
Zero in 
confidence 
interval
Live Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.02 -0.12 0.00
Ninety-day Calls 0.13 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.40 0.00
Thirty-day Puts -0.36 -0.27 -0.29 -0.18 -0.57 -0.39
Ninety-day Puts -0.57 -0.46 -0.54 -0.36 -0.68 -0.15
Feeder Cattle
Thirty-day Calls 0.49 0.35 0.19 0.06 1.12 0.81
Ninety-day Calls 0.49 0.23 0.16 0.00 1.57 0.74
Thirty-day Puts -0.18 -0.06 -0.21 -0.10 -0.10 0.00
Ninety-day Puts -0.41 -0.22 -0.50 -0.33 -0.13 0.00
Note: All return adjustments are denominated in $/cwt.  For example, a .50 
decrease needed in option premiums would suggest a $5/cwt option would need to 
be valued at $4.50/cwt.  Deeper colors of red and green respectively indicate more 
significant option overpricing and under-pricing.
Table 11. Changes in Initial Option Premiums Needed for Efficient Pricing
All Years Early Period Later Period
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Live Cattle 
Thirty-Day
Live Cattle 
Ninety-Day
Feeder Cattle 
Thirty-Day
Feeder Cattle 
Ninety-Day
All Years
          Dollar Return 160.07 (.01) 3.23 (.98) -40.57 (.52) -46.02 (.77)
          Percent Return 14.21 (.01) -3.42 (.59) -2.83 (.64) -3.32 (.68)
Early Period
          Dollar Return 100.44 (.09) -29.81 (.77) 5.09 (.93) 150.45 (.26)
          Percent Return 11.89  (.06) -4.15 (.56) .74 (.91) 6.03 (.41)
Later Period
          Dollar Return 438.33 (.02) 134.76 (.74) -255.37 (.20) -859.05 (.11)
          Percent Return 24.98 (.05) .37 (.98) -19.64 (.18) -42.05 (.03)
Table 12. Short Straddle Returns
Period and Return
Note: p-values of straddle returns are shown in parantheses.  The early period contains 
all observations from the start of the data until October 2003, while the later period runs 
from October 2003 to the end of the data.
Mean SD CV Observations
Live Cattle 996
Realized Volatility 0.103 0.096 0.932
Implied Volatility 0.146 0.046 0.315
GARCH (1,1) t 0.135 0.047 0.348
Feeder Cattle 887
Realized Volatility 0.087 0.086 0.989
Implied Volatility 0.106 0.044 0.415
GARCH (1,1) t 0.113 0.046 0.407
Table 13. Live and Feeder Cattle Volatility Measures
Commodity and Volatility 
Measure
Live cattle data range: 1/1989- 1/2008. Feeder Cattle data range: 
3/1991- 1/2008. The coefficient of variation (CV) is equal to 
standard deviation divided by mean.  All volatility measures are 
annualized.
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RV IV GARCH RV IV GARCH
Live Cattle
Realized Volatility 1.00
Implied Volatility .49 1.00
GARCH (1,1) t .28 .77 1.00
Feeder Cattle
Realized Volatility 1.00
Implied Volatility .54 1.00
GARCH (1,1) t .29 .59 1.00
Table 14. Correlation Matrix
Commodity and Volatility Live Cattle Feeder Cattle
Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Coefficient of 
Variation
Live Cattle
GARCH(1,1) t 0.135 0.047 0.348
GARCH(1,1) normal 0.133 0.050 0.376
GARCH (1,1) ged 0.133 0.049 0.368
Feeder Cattle
GARCH(1,1) t 0.113 0.046 0.407
GARCH(1,1) normal 0.113 0.047 0.416
GARCH (1,1) ged 0.112 0.046 0.411
Threshold GJR GARCH (1,1) 0.115 0.058 0.504
Asymmetric GARCH (1,1) 0.113 0.046 0.407
Table 15.  GARCH Model Comparison
Commodity and GARCH Model
Note: GJR and Asymmetric GARCH models did not converge in live cattle for 
extended periods.
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Commodity and 
Volatility 
Measure
Early 
Period
Later 
Period
Change 
Between 
Periods
Observations 
in Early 
Period
Observations 
in Later Period
Live Cattle 770 226
Realized Volatility 0.094 0.132 +0.038
Implied Volatility 0.135 0.185 +0.050
GARCH (1,1) t 0.124 0.171 +0.047
Feeder Cattle 661 226
Realized Volatility 0.077 0.117 +0.04
Implied Volatility 0.097 0.133 +0.036
GARCH (1,1) t 0.103 0.142 +0.039
 Table 16. Live and Feeder Cattle Average Volatilities by Period
Note: All volatility measures are weekly volatilities converted to an 
annualized basis.  The early period contains all observations from the start of 
the data until October 2003, while the later period runs from October 2003 to 
All Years
Early 
Period
Later 
Period
Change 
Between 
Periods
Live Cattle
Implied Volatility -0.044* -0.041* -0.052* -.011
GARCH (1,1) t -0.032* -0.030* -0.039* -.009
Feeder Cattle
Implied Volatility -0.018* -0.019* -0.016* +.003
GARCH (1,1) t -0.026* -0.026* -0.025* +.001
Regression:
Commodity and Forecast
Table 17. Live and Feeder Cattle Forecast Errors
Note: Forecast error is defined as realized volatility minus forecast volatility.  
An asterisk (*) indicates forecast error differs from zero at 5% level.
, , 1 1 1( )           : 0t realized t forecast t te H        
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Commodity and Forecast Θ1 Θ2
Live Cattle
Implied Volatility .052* .0000358*
GARCH (1,1) t .052* .0000331*
Feeder Cattle
Implied Volatility .039* .0000293*
GARCH (1,1) t .037* .0000435*
Table 18. Live and Feeder Cattle Error Trend Regressions
Regression:
Note: Asterisk (*) indicates significance at 5% level.
1 2 2( )   : 0t t t oe t r e n d H       
MAE MSE 
All years
Live Cattle 2.00* -.94
Feeder Cattle -6.37* -1.74
Early Period
Live Cattle .91  .01
Feeder Cattle -1.95* -.063
Later Period
Live Cattle .42  -1.03
Feeder Cattle -2.49* -1.25
Table 19. MDM Test Between Volatility Forecasts
Period and Commodity
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates MDM values significant at 5% level. 
MAE and MSE are mean absolute error and mean squared error.  A 
negative sign indicates the implied volatility forecast error is less 
than the GARCH alternative.
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α β1 β2 R2
Joint F 
test
Portmanteau 
Test (15 lags)
All Years
          Live Cattle
1 -.045  1.012 .232 0.00 0.00
2  .029* .548  .080 0.00 0.00
3 -.040* 1.361 -.419  .250 0.00 0.04
          Feeder Cattle
1 -.024  1.049 .286 0.00 0.13
2  .029* .513  .080 0.00 0.08
3 -.021  1.097 -.075  .286 0.00  0.15
Early Period
          Live Cattle
1 -.023  .871 .116 0.00 0.20
2  .028* .537  .039 0.00 0.09
3 -.013  1.143 -.378* .123 0.00 0.36
          Feeder Cattle
1 .000  .795 .137 0.00 0.01
2 .023* .529  .059 0.00 0.01
3 -.003  .752 .068  .135 0.00 0.01
Later Period
          Live Cattle
1 -.100* 1.254 .351 0.00 0.04
2 .039* .540  .077 0.00 0.00
3 -.086* 1.607 -.459  .379 0.00 0.26
          Feeder Cattle
1 -.051  1.255 .406 0.00 0.90
2 .055* .426  .052 0.00 0.87
3 -.042  1.320 -.129  .408 0.00 0.94
Table 20. Forecast Bias and Efficiency Regressions
Period, Commodity 
and Regression
Regressions:
Note: Tests on significance are based on Newey-West variances.  An asterisk 
(*) indicates significance at 5% level. p-values for Joint F and Portmanteau 
tests are shown. R-squared is the adjusted coefficient of determination.
, 1 , 1 11)   : 0, 1realized t IV t t H          
, 2 , 2 22)   : 0, 1realized t GARCH t t H          
, 1 , 2 , 3 1 23)   : 0, 1, 0realized t IV t GARCH t t H               
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α λ
All Years
Live Cattle -.049 -.408 (.13)
Feeder Cattle -.018 -.081 (.67)
Early Period
Live Cattle -.044 -.235 (.10)
Feeder Cattle -.021 .160 (.36)
Later Period
Live Cattle -.060 -.508 (.18)
Feeder Cattle -.015 -.210 (.42)
Regression:
Period and Commodity
Table 21. Forecast Encompassing Regressions
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates coefficient differs from 
zero at 5% significance level. Implied volatility is the 
preferred forecast in the regression. p-values for lambda 
coefficients are shown in parentheses.
1 1 2 11) ( - )   : 0t t t te e e H      
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Figure 7. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Call Returns Histogram,
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Figure 8. Live Cattle Call Dollar Returns by Moneyness, 
1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 9. Live Cattle Put Percent Returns by Moneyness, 
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Figure 10. Live Cattle Thirty-Day Call Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 11. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Call Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
77 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2500
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
24
-J
an
-8
5
24
-J
an
-8
6
24
-J
an
-8
7
24
-J
an
-8
8
24
-J
an
-8
9
24
-J
an
-9
0
24
-J
an
-9
1
24
-J
an
-9
2
24
-J
an
-9
3
24
-J
an
-9
4
24
-J
an
-9
5
24
-J
an
-9
6
24
-J
an
-9
7
24
-J
an
-9
8
24
-J
an
-9
9
24
-J
an
-0
0
24
-J
an
-0
1
24
-J
an
-0
2
24
-J
an
-0
3
24
-J
an
-0
4
24
-J
an
-0
5
24
-J
an
-0
6
24
-J
an
-0
7
24
-J
an
-0
8
R
et
ur
n 
($
/c
on
tra
ct
)
Date
Figure 12. Live Cattle Thirty-Day Put Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 13. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Put Returns, 1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 14. Individual Live Cattle Put Option Valuation, 6/2003-
12/2004
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Figure 15. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Call Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
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Figure 16. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Call Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
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Figure 17. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Put Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
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Figure 18. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Put Returns, 3/1987-1/2008
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Figure 19. Live Cattle Thirty-Day Short Straddle Dollar Returns, 
1/1985-1/2008
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Figure 21. Live Cattle Implied Volatility Histogram, 1/1989-1/2008
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Figure 20. Live Cattle Realized Volatility Histogram, 1/1989-1/2008
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Figure 23. Live Cattle Weekly Realized Volatility and Implied 
Volatility, 1/1989-1/2008 
Implied Volatility Realized Volatility
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Figure 22. Live Cattle GARCH(1,1)-t Histogram, 1/1989-1/2008
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Figure 24. Feeder Cattle Weekly Realized Volatility and Implied 
Volatility, 1/1991-1/2008
Implied Volatility Realized Volatility
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Figure 25. Live and Feeder Cattle Implied Volatility Forecast 
Errors, 1/1989-1/2008
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Figure 26. Live Cattle Average Annual Weekly Forecast Error, 
1/1989-1/2008
Implied Volatility GARCH(1,1) t
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Figure 27. Feeder Cattle Average Annual Weekly Forecast Error, 
3/1991-1/2008
Implied Volatility GARCH(1,1) t
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Figure 28. Live and Feeder Cattle Put-Call Parity Spread ,1/1985-
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CHAPTER 5 
 OVERVIEW, SUMMARY, AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Overview 
Beef cattle producers have faced higher levels of uncertainty in recent years from volatile 
input prices and demand shocks in the wake of mad-cow disease outbreaks in North 
America.  These shocks have made production decisions in this integral segment of 
American agriculture challenging.  Some feedlots have been forced to shut-down or run 
at minimal capacity due to high grain and energy prices, and fears of additional BSE 
outbreaks still remain.  Options are one type of financial instrument that gives market 
participants greater flexibility in dealing with higher levels of volatility and uncertainty 
seen recently.  The performance of live and feeder cattle options were studied from their 
inception to January 2008.  Empirical returns are more applicable to longer-term periods, 
while volatility forecasting is an appropriate method to judge option performance in 
short-term horizons.  Consequently, empirical returns are examined in thirty- and ninety-
day holding periods while volatility forecasting is studied in one-week horizons.  Both 
empirical returns and volatility forecasting are examined for all years of the data, and in 
“early” and “later” periods, which use October 2003 as a dividing line between periods.  
October 2003 was identified as a structural break in cattle markets by Jin et al (2008), but 
merely serves as a dividing line in our analysis since higher volatility in the later period 
was caused by many factors in addition to BSE outbreaks.   
The use of options on agricultural futures contracts has risen in recent decades 
since trading resumed in 1984. Options are widely-used financial instruments due to the 
more complex strategies and preferable cash flow considerations they offer when 
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compared to outright futures contracts.  Despite their popularity, complaints about 
overpricing in options are widespread.  Some advisory services even warn their 
customers about the high price of option premiums (Urcola 2007).  Call and put options 
offer buyers the possibility of locking in a price for an asset while reserving the right to 
capture a better market prevailing price. If option premiums are overpriced, then 
economic profits are accruing to option sellers, while buyers of options may be 
overpaying for insurance benefits that options offer.   
 Option overpricing violates basic assumptions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH), which attests that assets are fairly priced such that economic profits from holding 
assets are zero.  Two general approaches researchers have taken in assessing option 
performance are testing of empirical returns from holding options, and analysis of the 
predictive ability of implied volatility in forecasting subsequent realized volatility in the 
underlying asset. If options are correctly priced, risk-adjusted empirical returns should 
average zero, and implied volatility should function as an unbiased, efficient forecast of 
realized volatility. Most prior research has focused on financial indices such as the S&P 
500, where Bondarenko (2003) and Coval and Shumway (2000) found overpricing in 
S&P 500 puts. 
 In recent years, studies on agricultural option market performance have surfaced.  
Urcola (2007) tested the empirical returns of corn, soybean, wheat and hog options.  The 
evidence generally found widespread efficient pricing in these markets, with only a few 
exceptions found in profitable arbitrage opportunities in hog puts.  Manfredo, Leuthold, 
and Irwin (2001) found that implied volatility was a useful forecast of spot price volatility 
in corn markets, but not in live or feeder cattle. Szakmary et al (2003) tested implied 
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volatility performance in thirty-five commodities and found that in most commodities 
implied volatility performed reasonably well and encompassed information in historical 
volatility and GARCH forecasts, but it failed to encompass GARCH forecasts in live and 
feeder cattle.  Manfredo and Sanders (2004) found that live cattle implied volatility was a 
biased and inefficient forecast of one-week subsequent realized volatility. Live cattle 
implied volatility overstated RV by 4.5%, yet it encompassed a GARCH alternative 
forecast.  This analysis adds to cattle option market research by analyzing empirical 
returns in live and feeder cattle options and through assessment of feeder cattle volatility 
forecasting, neither of which has been examined previously.  Further, while past studies 
have assessed live cattle volatility forecasting, none have included recent years of higher    
volatility which may have caused significant changes in option performance.  
 Live and feeder cattle markets are susceptible to unique biological risks and 
market dynamics.  Large outbreaks of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), 
otherwise known as mad-cow disease, occurred in England in the 1980’s, and spread to 
other continents in the 1990’s.  Previous studies by Paiva (2003), Tse and Hackard 
(2006), Jin et al (2008), and Marsh et al (2008) indicate the BSE outbreaks in England, 
Canada, and America resulted in significant negative movements in American live cattle 
prices.  Two significant BSE cases occurred in May 2003 in Canada and December 2003 
in Washington.  The December 2003 case had extreme impacts on the market as many 
American export markets were shut down immediately.  There were large concerns about 
catastrophic risk in cattle markets from the combination of lost consumer demand and 
export markets, and fear of widespread BSE outbreaks in American herds.    
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 The dataset was comprised of live and feeder cattle daily option settlement prices, 
volume, and open interest, and was provided by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME).  Live cattle data ranged from 10/30/1984 to 1/30/2008, and from 1/9/1987 to 
1/30/2008 in feeder cattle.  Futures prices and interest rates were added to the dataset. 
 The first broad test of live and feeder cattle option performance consisted of 
calculating empirical returns to option based on the construction of thirty- and ninety-day 
holding periods for call and put options.  These simulated trading strategies entailed a 
buy and hold strategy until option expiration.  Returns were calculated as both dollar and 
percent returns. Observations were filtered based on volume, strike price moneyness, and 
minimum premium size in order to eliminate problematic options such as ones deeply out 
or in-the-money and illiquid options.   
 The second test of option performance included testing implied volatility and 
GARCH forecasts in predicting subsequent one-week realized volatility of underlying 
futures prices.  Forecast performance was analyzed through forecast bias, efficiency, and 
encompassing.  Realized volatility and GARCH series were constructed based on past 
futures prices, while the implied volatility series was constructed by averaging the four 
at-the-money options.  Several different GARCH models with varying mean, (p,q), and 
error specification structures were tested, but a GARCH(1,1) t-distribution with zero 
mean specification was chosen as the preferred GARCH model.  
 
5.2 Summary and Conclusions 
Empirical returns from live and feeder cattle options initially suggested widespread 
option mispricing, since significant returns existed in live and feeder cattle puts and 
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feeder cattle calls.  The magnitude and cause of these returns was further examined by 
construction of short straddle positions, which remove the influence of futures price 
movements.  Live and feeder cattle prices drifted upward in the time periods examined, 
which may have resulted in put sellers and call holders being the natural winners.  Short 
straddle positions were profitable in thirty-day live cattle options, but ninety-day live 
cattle and thirty- and ninety-day feeder cattle short straddles produced insignificant 
returns.  These findings provide strong evidence that short-term live cattle options are 
mispriced at a level large enough to be unexplainable from futures price movements, and 
consequently these options may contain risk premiums or path peso problems.  On the 
other hand, strong returns in longer-term live cattle options and short- and longer-term 
feeder cattle options seem heavily influenced by drifts in futures prices. 
Volatility forecasting results concluded that both live and feeder cattle implied 
volatility and GARCH forecasts were upwardly biased, inefficient forecasters of one-
week realized volatility.  Realized volatility had a smaller mean but larger variation than 
both forecasts for live and feeder cattle.  The level of realized volatility overstatement by 
implied volatility forecasts was more than twice as large in live cattle than feeder cattle.  
Even though implied volatility forecasts were biased, they generally encompassed 
GARCH alternative forecasts except for the live cattle market.  Live and feeder cattle 
implied volatility forecasts encompassed GARCH alternatives, as evidenced by statistics 
that showed implied volatility forecast errors were not improved by the addition of 
GARCH forecasts.  While implied volatility may itself be a poor forecaster of realized 
volatility, there is no alternative forecast that comes close to achieving the predictive 
power of implied volatility forecasts. 
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The overall tenure of findings from all procedures and time horizons studied is 
remarkably consistent.  Based on the combined analysis of empirical returns and 
volatility forecasting, systematic overpricing is most persistent in live cattle puts at 
shorter horizons. When empirical returns are studied, losses to live cattle puts are more 
severe than feeder cattle puts, and short straddles are profitable in thirty-day live cattle 
options.  This finding of greater mispricing in live cattle options is reinforced by 
volatility forecasting tests, where live cattle implied volatility overstated realized 
volatility more than twice as much as feeder cattle.  Additionally, the patterns found 
between the early and later periods are consistent between procedures.  Largest losses to 
option holders and realized volatility overstatement appeared in live cattle in the later 
period, while empirical returns and realized volatility overstatement improved in feeder 
cattle.   
The pattern of greater option mispricing in live cattle options was unexpected, 
since live cattle markets are clearly more heavily traded than feeder cattle.  Often, higher 
volume should lead to greater efficiencies in pricing as more information is transmitted 
with more volume.  This economic notion would suggest live cattle options should be 
more “correctly” priced.  Despite live cattle annual volume being much larger, feeder 
cattle options outperformed live cattle in empirical returns and volatility forecasting.   
While the exact rationale for larger option mispricing in live cattle than feeder 
options is not known, several explanations based on the underlying characteristics of 
production may exist.  Commercial feedlots operations that frequently use live cattle puts 
have large investments in facilities and livestock and limited short-term flexibility in their 
production process.   In contrast, feeder cattle operations are usually much smaller in 
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size, often producing less than contract weight specifications.  Feeder cattle producers 
also often raise feeder cattle as part of a more diversified farm portfolio.  In a similar 
light, feeder cattle producers have more flexibility in timing their sales as feeders can be 
held on pasture for several weeks or months until market conditions improve.  The 
combination of large investments and reduced flexibility in production may result in 
feedlot operators paying an additional premium to manage their output price risk. 
 The results are fairly consistent with prior studies on cattle option volatility 
forecasting, but deviate somewhat from analysis of empirical returns for other 
agricultural options markets.  The findings on volatility forecasting performance are 
similar to Manfredo and Sanders (2004), who found that live cattle implied volatility was 
a biased and inefficient forecast of realized volatility, yet still encompassed GARCH 
alternatives.  Unlike Szakmary et al (2003), this study finds that live and feeder cattle 
implied volatility forecasts encompass GARCH alternatives.  This study constructed 
GARCH models as out-of-sample weekly forecasts, while Szakmary’s study was in-
sample and used daily data, which may explain the differences in forecast encompassing 
found.  The findings here agree with Jin et al (2008), in that shocks to the market in 
recent years were more severe and long-lasting in shorter-term horizons.  Depending on 
the framework through which efficiency is viewed, the study appears to contrast with 
evidence of widespread efficient pricing in agricultural options found by Urcola (2007).  
This disagreement is reduced once futures price movements in live and feeder cattle 
options are accounted for, after which only short-term live cattle options appear to be 
mispriced. However, our overall results demonstrate inefficiency and considerable risk 
behavior in returns found in short-term live cattle options, which is consistent with 
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previous research where evidence of bias and inefficiency in live cattle volatility 
forecasts was found.  
Suggestions for further research include further analysis of option trading 
strategies that could profit from overpricing and/or risk premiums present in these 
options, particularly in short-term live cattle options.  Additionally, a more sophisticated 
way to compare Sharpe ratios from cattle options to other investment classes would likely 
be beneficial.  This would allow for a more comprehensive assessment of whether the 
strong returns found in certain cattle options are preferable to other investments in the 
presence of the volatility identified.  Analysis of volatility forecast performance for 
periods longer than one-week could also prove useful as the temporal dimension of 
realized volatility overstatement from forecasts could be identified.  Finally, research to 
identify more completely the factors that explain the differences in risk premiums 
between live and feeder cattle markets would lead to a better understanding of market 
behavior. 
The economic implications found from this study vary somewhat depending on 
whether live or feeder cattle markets are examined.  Regardless, overstatement of realized 
volatility from implied volatility forecasts is a pervasive problem in cattle options.  
Similar to Manfredo and Sanders, we conclude that the best course for risk managers to 
deal with implied volatility bias is to adjust volatility forecasts for the upward bias found.  
The amount of adjustment needed would be smaller in feeder cattle volatility forecasts.   
Results found from straddle returns and volatility forecasting suggest that biases and risk 
premiums in short-term live cattle options are problematic.  Consequently, producers 
should be aware that the cost of using short-term live cattle options may indeed be higher 
95 
 
than warranted. This cost translates into an amount less than 1% of the value of the cattle, 
which may seem small but could be a significant when added to other financial burdens 
in cattle production.  Option traders, who trade based solely on volatility, should be 
aware that live cattle options in particular may have inflated implied volatilities which are 
higher closer to option expiration. 
Studies of live cattle futures prices (Hartzmark 1987, Elam and Njukia 1993) have 
identified patterns in trader returns and biases in prices that are quite different from other 
agricultural commodities.  In the same vein, we find that empirical returns from live and 
feeder cattle options are anomalous when compared to commodities such as corn, 
soybeans, and wheat (Urcola 2007). Unique production characteristics, biological risks, 
and/or an idiosyncratic market structure could be causing this price behavior to emerge.   
Further research is warranted to ascertain the exact source of this observed behavior 
which seems to appear more frequently in live cattle and feeder cattle markets.   
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APPENDIX 
 
SEASONALITY, HISTOGRAMS, MONEYNESS, AND ANNUAL RETURNS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contract Month Coefficient P-value
G -0.000504 .808
J (dropped)
M -0.001993 .34
Q 0.000516 .95
V 0.000130 .73
Z .000716 .51
Table A1. Live Cattle Contract Seasonality
Note: One contract dropped due to collinearity.  
Coefficients show contract effects on mean returns 
from 1/1989 to 1/2008.
Contract Month Coefficient P-value
Jan. .003091 .29
Feb. .003080 .29
March -.001970 .51
April -.001034 .73
May (dropped)
June .001644 .58
July .003519 .23
August .000214 .94
Sep. .002684 .36
Oct. .002413 .41
Nov. .002343 .42
Dec. -.001345 .65
Table A2.  Live Cattle Monthly Seasonality
Note: One month dropped due to collinearity.  
Coefficients show month effects on mean returns from 
1/1989 to 1/2008.
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Contract Month Coefficient P-value
H -.005604 .01
J -.004689 .06
K (dropped)
Q -.001543 .45
U -.002696 .29
V -.005868 .02
X -.005528 .04
F -.005379 .01
Table A3. Feeder Cattle Contract Seasonality
Note: One contract dropped due to collinearity.  
Coefficients show contract effects on mean returns 
from 3/1991 to 1/2008.
Contract Month Coefficient P-value
Jan. -.000135 .96
Feb. -.002052 .42
March (dropped)
April .000128 .96
May .002968 .24
June .00188 .45
July .003846 .13
August .001653 .51
Sep. .000668 .79
Oct. -.000143 .57
Nov. -.000153 .95
Dec. -.004105 .10
Table A4. Feeder Cattle Monthly Seasonality
Note: One month dropped due to collinearity.  
Coefficients show month effects on mean returns from 
3/1991 to 1/2008.
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α λ
Live Cattle
GARCH(1,1) t -.049 -.408 (.13)
GARCH (1,1) -.049 -.399 (.13)
GARCH(1,1) ged -.049 -.404 (.13)
Feeder Cattle
GARCH(1,1) t -.018 -.084 (.67)
GARCH (1,1) -.018 -.084 (.67)
GARCH(1,1) ged -.018 -.084 (.67)
Threshold GJR GARCH(1,1) -.018 -.055 (.74)
Asymmetric GARCH(1,1) -.018 -.065 (.72)
Regression:
Table A5. GARCH  Forecast Encompassing Comparison
GARCH Model
Note: Implied volatility is the preferred forecast.  An asterisk (*) 
indicates coefficient differs from zero at 5% significance level.  P-
values are shown in parantheses.
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Figure A1.  Thirty-Day Live Cattle Call Returns Histogram, 
1/1985-1/2008 
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Figure A3. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Put Returns Histogram,
1/1985-1/2008 
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Figure A2. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Call Returns Histogram,
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Figure A5. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Call Returns Histogram, 
3/1987-1/2008 
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Figure A4. Feeder Cattle Thirty-Day Put Returns Histogram, 
3/1987-1/2008 
Pe
rc
en
t o
f O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
104 
 
 
 
0
20 
40 
60 
80 
0 1000 2000 3000 4000
Percent Return
Figure A7. Live Cattle Ninety-Day Put Percent Returns Histogram, 
1/1985-1/2008 
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Figure A6. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Put Returns Histogram, 
3/1987-1/2008 
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Figure A9. Live Cattle Implied Volatility Forecast Error Histogram, 
1/1989-1/2008 
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Figure A8. Feeder Cattle Ninety-Day Call Percent Returns Histogram, 
3/1987-1/2008 
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Figure A11. Feeder Cattle Realized Volatility Histogram, 
3/1991-1/2008 
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Figure A10. Live Cattle GARCH(1,1)-t Forecast Error Histogram,
1/1989-1/2008 
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Figure A13. Feeder Cattle GARCH(1,1)-t Histogram, 
3/1991-1/2008 
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Figure A12. Feeder Cattle Implied Volatility Histogram, 
3/1991-1/2008 
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Figure A15. Feeder Cattle GARCH(1,1)-t Forecast Error Histogram, 
3/1991-1/2008 
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Figure A14. Feeder Cattle Implied Volatility Forecast Error Histogram, 
3/1991-1/2008 
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Figure A16. Live Cattle Call Percent Returns by Moneyness, 
1/1985-1/2008
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Figure A17. Feeder Cattle Call Percent Returns by Moneyness, 
3/1987-1/2008
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Figure A18. Live Cattle Put Dollar Returns by Moneyness, 1/1985-
1/2008
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Figure A19. Feeder Cattle Put Dollar Returns by Moneyness, 
3/1987-1/2008
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Figure A20. Feeder Cattle Put Percent Returns by Moneyness, 
3/1987-1/2008
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Figure A21. Live Cattle Average Annual Thirty-Day Option 
Returns, 1/1985-12/2007
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Figure A22. Live Cattle Average Annual Ninety-Day Option 
Returns, 1/1985-12/2007
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Figure A23. Feeder Cattle Average Annual Thirty-Day Option 
Returns, 3/1987-12/2007
Calls Puts
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Figure A24. Feeder Cattle Average Annual Ninety-Day Option 
Returns, 3/1987-12/2007
Calls Puts
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Figure A25. Feeder Cattle GARCH Model Forecast Error 
Comparison, 3/1991-12/2007
GARCH(1,1) GARCH(1,1) t
